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FTC RULEMAKING THROUGH NEGOTIATION 
CHARLES H. KocH, JR.t 
AND BETH MAR.TIN:j: 
The Federal Trade Commission~ along with oth,er administrative 
agencies, has been especially ajfected by the current emphasis on dereg-
ulation. Some proponents of the free market system view the Commis-
sion as an unnecessary and costly impediment to market fi'Jnctioning. 
In this article, Professor Koch and Ms. Martin review past FTC regula-
tory efforts in light of the FTC's mandate: to maintain an ejftcient~ com-
petitive free market. Although the FTC has deviated from its market 
maintenance goa/., this deviation should not serve as a basis for con-
stricting Commission rulemaking activity. Rather.. the authors demon-
strate that past Commission practices illustrate the need for tm i'!formal 
rulemaking procedure that is sensitive to the needs of both consumers 
and industry. 
Throughout the political spectrum, the nation's policymakers are espous-
ing a newfound devotion to deregulation. Numerous policy arguments have 
been advanced to support a decrease in government involvement in social and 
economic activities, but the driving force behind deregulation has been the 
growing political power of business interests. This power deriv•~s less from the 
traditional authority accruing to wealth than from a revitalized doctrine that 
commerce best serves the greater interests of society. Emerging in the decade 
of the Seventies was a reaffirmation of Coolidge's observation: ''The business 
of America is business." 
A corollary of this doctrine is the acceptance of the existence of social and 
economic winners and losers. Because our democratic, capitalistic system re-
quires rewards and losses, its adherents distrust any institution that insulates a 
major part of society from the risk of loss. One regulatory institution per-
ceived as interfering with these natural processes is the Federal Trade Com-
mission. Contrary to this perception, the motivation behind the creation of the 
FTC was a desire to protect economic processes from various anticompetitive 
practices; only later was the FTC permitted to police anticonsumer practices. 1 
t Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary; B.A. 
1966, University of Maryland; J.D. 1969, George Washington University; L.L.M. 1975, University 
ofChicago. . . 
:j: Clerk to Judge Tom Cauthorn, State Court of Cobb County, Marietta, Georgia; B.A. 
1978, State University of New York at Albany; J.D. 1981, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College 
of William and Mary. 
1. The legislative history is extensive: Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 
(1914); ar amended by ch. 49, § 1107, 52 Stat. Ill (1938); ar amended by ch. 601, sec. 1107, § 5(a), 
52 Stat. 1026, 1028 (1938); ar amended by ch. 61, sec. 4, §§ 5, 15, 64 Stat. 20, 21-22 (1950); ar 
amended by ch. 745, 66 Stat. 631 (1952); ar amended by Pub. L. No. 85-726, sec. 414, §1, 72 Stat. 
731, 770 (1958); ar amended by Pub. L. No. 85-791, sec. 3-4, §§ 5(b), 5(c), 11, 72 Stat. 941, 942-43 
(1958); ar amended by Pub. L. No. 86-507, sec. 13, § 5(f), 74 Stat. 200 (1960); flS amended by Pub. 
L. No. 93-153, sec. 408, §§ 5(1), 6, 13, 16, 87 Stat. 576, 591-92 (1973); ar amended by Pub. L. No. 
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The regulatory mandate of the FTC does not require that it replace market 
resource allocation decisionmaking with government decisionmaking. Rather, 
the FTC's function is to maintain market machinery so that the market, not 
the government, allocates resources in the best interests of the entire 
population. 
The FTC performs this function in two ways. First, it must assure contin-
ued competition in the marketplace, because only a competitive market allows 
proper economic functioning.2 Second, it must strive to encourage confidence 
in the marketplace among the ultimate economic decisionmakers, consumers.3 
The FTC's consumer protection function is as much a market maintenance 
activity as is its antitrust function. Regulation for the protection of the con-
sumer is intended neither to substitute government decisions for the market-
place choices nor to insulate consumers in the marketplace from the risk of 
loss. In performing its market maintenance function the FTC does, of course, 
lower the risk to consumers in dealing in the marketplace. The risk reduction, 
however, is aimed at eliminating fears that would deter consumers from enter-
ing the marketplace, rather than affecting consumer behavior thereafter. 
If the FTC is performing its function properly, honest commercial inter-
ests should be as supportative of the FTC's activities as are consumer interests. 
The FTC should assist in creating a market enviroment in which consumers 
and honest commercial entities can trade efficiently to their mutual benefit. 
There is strong evidence, however, that neither commercial interests nor con-
sumers interests are content with the way the FTC currently regulates the 
marketplace. To a large extent, such dissatisfaction is intrinsic to the FTC's 
performance of its policing function; no one particularly likes the police even 
though in the abstract we recognize that they exist for our benefit. Dissatis-
faction also emanates from the ambiguous mandate given the FTC by Con-
gress.4 Moreover, the FTC carries a subtle public image burden: consumer 
interests want the FTC to protect not only the marketplace but also the losers; 
business interests see only the short-range costs of market maintenance regu-
lation instead of the long-range benefits of market maintenance regulation. 
The vigor of recent criticism surpasses predictable objections and sug-
gests that an actual breakdown in performance has occurred. Dissatisfaction 
with the FTC, especially within the business community, has reached a level 
that raises concern as to whether the agency is properly performing its func-
93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975); as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-145, sec. 3, § 5(a), 89 Stat. 801 (1975); 
as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-37, 93 Stat. 95 (1979); as amended by Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 
374 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-57 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). 
2. H.R. REP. No. 533, Part 2, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914). 
3. The FTC authority over consumer protection was affirmed by the Wheeler-Lea amend-
ment to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1938. It declared unlawful ''unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices." Act of March 21, 1938, ch. 49, 52 Stat. 111. See supra note 1. 
4. J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 100-03 (1978). Freedman cites several factorS 
that combine to produce an ambiguous mandate: ''the FTC deals with an unmanageably broad 
spectrum of economic activity, usually has not had strong support from either the industries it 
regulates or the Congress, has been hampered by inadequate enforcement authority and insuffi-
cient funding, and has been less successful •.. [than other agencies] in attracting well qualified 
personnel." Id. at 103. 
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tion. The FTC's mandate requires sensitivity to the objectives of commercial 
interests because attention to these objectives reveals the proper scope of gov-
ernment efforts to enhance market functioning. The heated criticism the 
agency has suffered from business interests highlights the failure of the agency 
to implement its market maintenance function properly. The past FTC ad-
ministration ignored these criticisms; the present FTC administration appar-
ently is committed to the elimination of the FTC's role in the economy.5 
These approaches are neither productive nor realistic. Whatever the wisdom 
of deregulation in other areas, stifling the FTC is not deregulation in its true 
sense. Rather, it represents an attack on governmental efforts that seek to as-
sure an efficient market system. The issue is not a market economy versus a 
regulated economy, but whether the FTC is properly performing its market 
policing function.6 The way to answer the agency's critics is to assure that the 
FTC successfully furthers its market maintenance functions. 
The FTC's original mandate was to enhance the operation of the market-
place by policing unfair methods of competition.7 Mr. Brandeis, then advisor 
to President Wilson, insisted on creating an agency to eliminate unfair meth-
ods of competition rather than relying on machinery dependent upon judicial 
enforcement for its effect.8 He successfully argued against Wilson's own idea 
of delineating a laundry list of prohibited unfair methods of competition-
some of which survived as set forth in the Clayton Act9-by convincing Wil-
son and Congress that business interests would find ways around even the 
most complete list of anticompetitive practices.10 Thus, it is fundamental to 
5. For example, legislative cutbacks of the FTC are now under way in Congress. In May 
1982, the Senate Co=erce Committee voted to exempt professional associations from FTC anti-
trust scrutiny, to prohibit FTC challenges to co=ercial advertising under the unfairness doc-
trine, and warned the FTC to avoid regulation of agricultural cooperatives. The Senate 
Co=erce Committee also voted to continue the legislative veto power over FTC rules and to 
require the FTC to demonstrate that a practice is "prevalent" within an industry before adopting a 
Trade Regulation Rule. Senate Commerce Commillee Approves Exemptions ftom FTC Jurisdiction 
for Professionals, Advertisers, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. I 064, at 1023 (May 
13, 1982). 
The agency is also threatened with continued staff reductions. On April 16, 1982, the FTC 
announced that it would close four of its ten regional offices in an effort to reduce agency costs. 
FTC lJecides to Close Its Four Regional Offices in Los Angeles, Seallle, lJem•er and Boston, 42 
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1061, at 807 {April22, 1982). The four-office shut-
down, which was scheduled to occur on July 15, 1982, however, never took place. On May 28, 
1982, the four offices were notified that plans to eliminate the offices had been suspended pending 
further study. FTC Suspends Its Proposal to Close Four Regional Offices, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE 
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1067, at 1155 (June 3, 1982). 
6. At present, national policy favors a market economy, and hence the basic ideology of the 
FTC's function is not questioned in this article. 
7. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311,38 Stat. 717 (1914) (current version at IS U.S.C. 
§§ 41-57 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). 
8. 2 A. LINK, WILSON: THE NEW FREEDOM 434-35 {1956). 
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
10. Wilson later said: "At first I was inclined to think that various . . . practices had become 
obviously unfair and detriniental and that it would be best to define them as such in the Clayton 
law. As I talked with businessmen and students oflegislation, however, I came to agree with them 
that these unfair practices would be (best] reached through the Trade Commission law [i.e., the 
strong commission bill]." A. W. Shaw, Memorandum of an Interview with 7¥ilson (January 4, 
1915) (Wilson Papers, Library of Congress), quoted in 2 A. LINK, supra note 8, at 438. 
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the very concept of the FTC that it continue to define and seek to remedy 
unfair practices. 
. The failure of the FTC to learn how to perform this function is a problem 
that has plagued the agency since it began operation in 1916. It has relied 
heavily upon individual formal adjudications in the apparent hope that re-
spondent businesses would present evidence relating to the market mainte-
nance implications of the FTC's individual decisions. Formal adjudication, 
however, was and is not a sound procedure for making generalized deci-
sions.11 Both the agency and private parties fail to focus on the broad applica-
tion of individual decisions. The agency seeks to resolve the individual 
controversy at hand, and the respondents focus on their personal plight; only 
incidental emphasis is placed on the market implications of the FTC action. 
Early in the agency's history it became apparent to those involved in 
agency policymaking that generalized decisions should be implemented 
through procedures that provide general guidance to business. Over the years 
the FTC evolved numerous processes for investigating the general facts and 
underlying policy questions behind regulatory decisions. While each of these 
processes was found wanting, each had advantages. Nevertheless, the FTC 
has failed to learn from and to improve on its various experiments; it tends to 
abandon one generation of regulatory devices for those of the next genera-
tion.12 Perhaps the solution to the dissatisfaction with the FTC's activities lies 
in the use of its past experiences to deal more effectively with regulatory 
problems. The agency should learn from its previous experiments to develop 
tools that will permit the FTC to perform effectively its market maintenance 
functions. 
I. THE FTC EXPERIENCE WITH VARIOUS RULEMAKING DEVICES 
The broad policymaking pronouncements of the FTC fit generally under 
the administrative law concept of "rulemaking." Administrative law theory 
distinguishes between rules that have the force of law, "legislative rules," and 
rules with no binding impact, "interpretative rules" and "general statements of 
policy."13 For most of its rulemaking history, the FTC has relied on interpre-
II. See 1 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 7.06 (1st ed. 1958). 
12. See R. HARVEY, A MANUAL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION LAWS (1916). 
13. The distinction between legislative and interpretative rules is one of the most well-estab-
lished and fundamental in administrative law. Legislative rules are those made pursuant to a 
delegation of authority to make rules. In contrast, the authority to make interpretative rules ema-
nates from no other authority than the necessary and proper authority inherent in the creation of 
an agency. Joseph v. Ynited States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1153 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). Because legislative rules are made pursuant to delegated authority and are, therefore, made 
under legislative mandate, they have the force oflegislation. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 
U.S. 281,295-96 (1979); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977). This process means that 
a court cannot substitute its own judgment for legislative rules. Indeed, judicial review of legisla-
tive rules is usually limited to arbitrariness, capriciousness, and abuse of discretion. See, e.g., 
Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas Best Freight Sys. Co., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974); Citizens to 
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). Because of their binding effect, legisla-
tive rules must be made through public participation. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Interpretative 
rules are merely vehicles for announcing an agency's view on a particular area of law or policy; 
they have no force other than the force of judgment expressed in them, and a court is free to 
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tative rules. In 1962 the FTC attempted to exercise its legislative rulemaking 
authority through its "trade regulation rules."14 Later, in National Petroleum 
Refiners Association v. FTC15 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals up~ 
held the agency's authority to make legislative rules through the informal pro~ 
cedures of section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A). 16 After the 
holding in National Petroleum Refiners, business interests intensified lobbying 
efforts to impose the strictures of formal rulemaking on the FTC. The result~ 
ing Magnuson~Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement 
Act (FTCIA), 17 however, affirmed the legislative rulemaking authority of the 
FTC. FTCIA required that in making rules the FTC institute only a few trial-
like procedures, thus establishing a ·classic ''hybrid" rulemaking process.18 
The FTC's shift in the late 1960s to legislative rulemaking in lieu of poll~ 
substitute its judgment Koch, Public Procedures for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and 
General Statements of Policy, 64 GEo. L.J. 1047 (1976). Futhermore, interpretative rules need not 
be made through public procedures, although some courts have imposed notice and comment 
procedures on proposed interpretative rules having substantial impact. See, e.g., Pickus v. United 
States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 
478, 482 (2d Cir. 1972); Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir. 1969). 
Pending legislation may amend the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to require public proce-
dures for certain interpretative rules. See i'!fra note 62. The "substantial impact" test does not 
define interpretative rules, and hence affects only their procedure and not their susceptibility to 
judicial revieW. See K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES§ 5.03-1, at 150-51 
(1976). 
14. General FTC procedures for trade regulation rules are set forth at 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.7-1.20 
(1982). A trade regulation rule is a legislative rule promulgated by the FTC under the authority of 
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission lnlprovement Act. Pub. L. No. 93-
637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)) 
(FTCIA). The FTCIA gives the FTC the authority to prescribe "rules which define with specificity 
acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 
U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). See i'!fra notes 49-54, 60-62 and accompanying text. 
15. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). 
16. Section 553 of the APA provides that legislative rules should be made after notice, oppor-
tunity for at least written comment, and statement of reasons for the rules. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit assumed that § 553 would apply if it found that the FTC had legislative rulemaking 
authority. The APA requires formal or trial-type rulemaking only in situations in which the stat-
ute requires a rule "to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing." 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(c) (1976). 
17. Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1976 
& Supp. IV 1980)). 
18. The concept of "hybrid" rulemaking grows out of a series of decisions holding that the 
notice and comment procedures of§ 553 of the APA represent a minimum and additional proce-
dures may be required in the interest of complete fact gathering and fairness. The germ of the 
concept can be found in Judge Leventhal's opinion in American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 
624 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966). The first case actually imposing hybrid rulemak-
ing was Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and the concept reached 
full bloom in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Empiri-
cal study of these decisions found that hybrid rulemaking did not improve the ntlemaking process. 
Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical 
Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 401 (1975). See also Leventhal, Improving the Administrative Pro-
cess-Time for a New APA?, 32 AD. L. REv. 287, 292-93 (1980). The Supreme Court in Vermont 
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), 
ended judicial imposition of hybrid rulemaking. Relying a good deal on the practical arguments 
against judicial imposition of hybrid rules put forth by Judge J. Skelly Wright in an earlier panel 
discussion at the National Conference on Federal Regulation, The Courts and the Rulemaking 
Process: The Limits of Judicial Review, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375 (1974), and a literal reading of 
the APA, Justice Rehnquist found that§ 553 procedures constituted not a minimum but rather the 
full extent of the procedures Congress intended to provide. 435 U.S. at 545-49. 
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cymaking through adjudication and interpretative rulemaking was a signifi-
cant event in the agency's law enforcement history. For the first time, the FTC 
ep1ployed a potent enforcement device that could place the members of an 
entire industry in jeopardy for committing a practice the FTC considered un-
fair or deceptive, in less time and with fewer resources than required for indi-
vidual adjudications.19 The efficacy ofthis device, however, created problems. 
From their inception, the FTC's legislative rulemaking activities have been 
soundly criticized, especially by business interests. Unfortunately, the current 
response of the FTC to these criticisms is virtually to eliminate its rulemaking 
· activities. 
Commentators have demonstrated that rulemaking is not only an effec-
tive regulatory mechanism, but when used in the proper circumstances, an 
equitable one.20 Ifrulemaking is an effective regulatory device, it is unfortu-
nate that the FTC is considering abandoning rulemaking efforts that serve to 
enhance the FTC's market maintenance performance. The FTC should con-
tinue to exercise its rulemaking power; breakdowns in the current regulatory 
structure should not be used as a justification for removing its rulemaking 
authority. Rather than eliminating rulemaking from its regulatory scheme, 
the FTC must examine the reasons for widespread dissatisfaction with the 
present rulemaking system and strive to improve its rulemaking techniques. 
A. Rulemaking Through General Public Participation 
The FTC has used two techniques for promulgating rules through public 
participation-industry guides and trade regulation rules. As the name sug-
gests, the guides provide guidance for subject industries by indicating those 
practices the FTC considers unfair or deceptive.21 Trade regulation rules are 
rules generally applicable to a segment of the industry; the rules are promul-
gated through the FTC's legislative rulemaking authority and have the force 
and effect of law. These two techniques sometimes coexist in the agency's 
repertoire of regulatory powers. While the FTC has favored one or the other 
at different times, the agency has never effectively combined these procedures 
19. See Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predictability in tire Application of the Merger 
Law, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 613, 618-24 (1965). 
20. See, e.g., STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON GoVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONO., )ST 
SESS., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, VOL. IV, .De/a}' in the Regulatory Process 36-37 (Comm. 
Print 1977); Pedersen, Formal and I'!formal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 39 (1975) ("The shift to 
rulemaking has been urged and supported both by commentators and to a surprising extent by the 
courts."); Shapiro, The Choice of Ru/emaking or Adjudication in the .Development of Administrative 
Policy, 78 HAR.v. L. REv. 921 (1965). 
Id 
21. Organization, Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (1982). The rule states: 
§ 1.5 Purpose (of Industry Guides] 
Industry guides are administrative interpretations oflaws administered by the Com-
mission for the guidance of the public in conducting its affairs in conformity with legal 
requirements. They provide the basis for voluntary and simultaneous abandonment of 
unlawful practices by members of industry. Failure to comply with the guides may re-
sult in corrective action by the Commission under applicable statutory provisions. 
Guides may relate to a practice common to many industries or to specific practices of a 
particular industry. 
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to institute a comprehensive regulatory scheme. The FTC started developing 
rules calling for general public participation in 1955 when it instituted its "In-
dustry Guide" procedure.22 Although this procedure incorporated participa-
tion through the basic notice and comment procedure, it was for the purpose 
of making rules having the limited effect of interpretative rules.23 The FTC 
continued its development of public participation rulemaking in 1962 with the 
creation of trade regulation rules.24 Originally, these rules also used basic no-
tice and comment procedures, but several legislative enactments added ele-
ments of trial and other procedural restraints to this basic procedure.25 
Experience with both guides and trade regulation rules is instructive in prob-
ing the strengths and the weaknesses of FTC rulemaking efforts. 
Industry guides were the first FTC rules made through general public 
participation. The FTC did not intend guides to have the binding effect of 
law.26 Rather, industry guides are intended to guide ''the public in conducting 
its affairs in conformity with legal requirements. They provide the basis for 
voluntary and simultaneous abandonment of unlawful practices by members 
of an industry."27 The FTC may promulgate industry guides when guidance 
regarding the legal requirements applicable to a particular practice or set of 
practices is in the public interest and would bring about more widespread and 
equitable observance of the laws under the jurisdiction of the FTC.28 The 
FTC seeks to eliminate widespread trade abuses through the use of guides; the 
guides, however, are not intended to prohibit every deceptive practice within a 
particular industry or group of industries. Rather, guides are intended to deal 
with serious and prevalent intra and interindustry abuses.29 
Industry guides can be divided into two categories: those that apply to a 
practice within a particular industry and those that apply to a practice or to 
22. Note, Voluntary Compliance: An Adjunct to the Mandatory Process, 38 IND. L.J. 377, 394 
(1963). 
23. Section 553 requires only an opportunity for written comment; the FTC consistently pro-
vided this opportunity in its guide proceedings. Id at 395. Indeed, it regularly provided for oral 
presentation in the heyday of its use of guides. 
24. See infra text accompanying notes 49-54. 
25. Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 
(1980); Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (1975); Magnuson-
Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 
(1975). . 
26. See Organization, Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1982). The rule 
states: 
§ 1.6 How [Industry Guides are] promulgated. 
Indus~ guides are promulgated by the Commission on its own initiative or pursu-
ant to petitiOn filed with the Secretary or upon informal application therefor, by any 
interested person or group, when it appears to the Commission that guidance as to the 
legal requirements applicable to particular practices would be beneficial in the public 
interest and would serve to bring about more widespread and equitable observance of 
laws administered by the Commission. In connection with the promulgation of industry 
guides, the Commission at any time may conduct such investigations, make such studies 
and hold such conferences or hearings as it may deem appropriate. . . . 
Id (footnote omitted). 
27. Id. § 1.5. 
28. Id. 
29. Note, supra note 22, at 396-97. 
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practices that are common to several industries.30 Representative of the first 
category are the Guides for the Nursery Industry promulgated by the Com-
mission in 1969.31 The Nursery Guides are specific and detailed, covering 
diverse topics related to the special characteristics of the industry, such as de-
ception, misrepresentation, trade practices, and standards.32 A representative 
example of the second category, the interindustry guides, is the guide against 
bait advertising.33 This is a broadly written guide that seeks to prohibit the 
once widely employed practice known as "bait and switch" advertising.34 The 
guides describe generally the improper "bait and switch" technique and spec-
ify certain practices that constitute prohibited conduct under the guides.35 
The guides procedure is set in motion by independent action of the FTC 
or by the complaint of any interested person.36 The FTC staff drafts the 
guides that are promulgated by the Commission.37 The FTC, through its staff 
members who prepare the guides, may in its discretion "conduct such investi-
gations, make such studies, and hold such conferences as it may deem appro-
priate."38 The FTC staff, however, is not required to use any of these tools in 
guide preparation. 
In the early 1960s the FTC began a continuing conference procedure 
under the industry guides program designed to educate businessmen and the 
general public about the agency's industry guides program.39 By educating 
those affected by the guides, the FTC seeks to foster cooperation and thus 
enforcement and compliance.40 Moreover, on request by a businessman af-
30. See generally 16 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1982). 
31. Guides for the Nursery Industry, 16 C.F.R. §§ 18.0-.8 (1982). 
32. For example, the guides prohibited deception through use of product names, /d. § 18.2; 
deception through substitution of nursery products, id. § 18.3; and deception through size and 
grade designation, id. § 18.4. The guides also developed standards applicable to plants grown in a 
wild state. I d. § 18.6. Other examples of industry specific guides include guides for the tire label-
ing and advertising industry, /d. §§ 228.0-.19; the metallic watch band industry, !d. §§ 19.0-.4; the 
hosiery industry, id. §§ 22.0-.6; and the household furniture industry, id. §§ 250.0-.15. 
33. /d. §§ 238.0-.4. Other examples of interindustry guides include guides against deceptive 
pricing, id. §§ 233.1-.S; guides against deceptive advertising of guarantees, /d. §§ 239.0-.7; and 
guides against deceptive debt collection practices, id. §§ 237.0-.6. 
34. Bait advertising has been described as: 
an alluring but insincere offer to sell a product or service that the advertiser in truth does 
not intend or want to sell. The essence of such a scheme is to switch the customer from 
the advertised product to a product that the advertiser actually wants to sell, usually at a 
higher price or on a basis more advantageous to the advertiser. 
E. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES 176 (2d ed. 1978). 
35. 16 C.F.R. §§ 238.0-.4 (1982). Prohibited "bait and switch" practices include a merchant's 
refusal to take orders for the "bait" merchandise for delivery within a reasonable time, /d. 
§ 238.3(d); disparagement of the "bait" product or its accoutrements, id. § 238.3(b); and refusal to 
show the "bait" product upon request, id. § 238.3(9). 
36. /d. § 1.6. 
37. /d. 
38. /d. See also Co=ent, Trade Rules and Trade Co'!ftrences: The FTC and Business AI· 
tack Deceptive Practice, Unfair Competition, and Antitrust Violations, 62 YALE L.J. 912, 921-24 
(1953). 
39. See Note, supra note 22, at 397. 
40. The primary compliance tool in connection with the guides program has been educa· 
tion. This is premised upon the belief that businessmen will regulate their conduct when 
informed of what the law demands. Mandatory enforcement measures are utilized only 
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fected by the guides, FTC attorneys will provide informal advice to help an 
affected businessman determine whether certain specific practices comply with 
the applicable guides. In an effort to promote further compliance with the 
guides, the FTC regularly distributes copies of the guides to aff~cted 
individuals.41 
The guides procedure has certain advantages over other industry-wide 
regulation techniques employed by the FTC. The guides technique is the most 
flexible of the agency's regulatory tools. Since industry cooperation is unnec-
essary for the promulgation of industry guides, they may serve to regulate a 
recalcitrant industry group unwilling to engage in self-regulation.42 Further-
more, because the Rules of Practice43 require that the FTC employ only sum-
mary procedure, guides may be promulgated more quickly than legislative 
rules.44 
The industry guides program should be used by the FTC to set informal 
standards for industry guidance. Although such rules lack the .full force and 
effect of law, the guides constitute a statement by the Commission of its opin-
ion of the law. Industry guides can provide the FTC with a powerful tool to 
foster industry compliance with agency views. 
Guides have fallen into disuse partly because of the development of a 
more militant consumer protection attitude and a concomitant antibusiness 
attitude ofthe FTC. In the Seventies the FTC saw itself as an adversary fight-
ing business interests that had a perceived tendency to violate the law. Thus, 
the FTC was more interested in imposing its will on recalcitrant commercial 
interests than in helping businessmen who might wish to obey the law or to 
understand the scope of the law. This approach may be counterproductive. 
Because section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) is very broad 
and ambiguous,45 effective law enforcement could result from adding con-
creteness to the regulatory language. Industry guides could provide the neces-
sary concreteness that would allow businessmen to attempt, voluntarily, to 
alter their business conduct. 
Nonetheless, there was considerable dissatisfaction with the guide pro-
gram as previously implemented by the Commission.46 One of the major criti-
cisms of the program was that the guides lacked sufficient force to compel the 
bad actors in the industry to comply with the standards set forth in the guides. 
where voluntary measures have failed or where, for reasons of public policy, voluntary 
measures are considered inadequate. The guides in no way amount to a finding by the 
Commission and do not necessarily a1fect any formal or informal matter before it. 
Id (footnotes omitted). 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 399. 
43. 16 C.F.R. §§ 0.1-15.491. 
44. Note, supra note 22, at 399. 
45. FJ'C's Leiter to Senate Subcommillee on Bill to Restrict Agency's Jurist:liction over Profes-
sionals and Unfair Acts or Practices, 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) No. 1055, at 568 
(Mar. 11, 1982); see Wald, Tlte FI'C and Industrywide Law E'!forcement, 30 J.B.A.D.C. 343, 349-
50 (1963). 
46. See E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION (1969). 
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The impact of guides was further diminished by the necessity of introducing 
evidence in any enforcement action to support the conclusions reached in the 
guide.47 Those willing to risk noncompliance were least affected by the 
guides, hence the program merely disadvantaged the responsible businesses 
vis-a-vis their unscrupulous competitors.48 As a consequence, guides failed to 
protect consumers from the worst members of an industry- those businesses 
whose sharp practices do the most damage to consumer confidence in efficient 
market functioning. Thus compelled to find a more potent industry-wide en-
forcement tool, the FTC established the legislative rulemaking program of 
trade regulation rules. 
In 1962 the Federal Trade Commission began its initial effort at legisla-
tive rulemaking by establishing a Rules Division within the Commission to 
promulgate trade regulation rules.49 The first trade regulation rule was 
promulgated in 1964 to regulate cigarette advertising.50 The statement of ba-
sis and purpose of this rulemaking effort indicates that a trade regulation rule 
is based on facts common to an entire industry and policy of broad applicabil-
ity. 51 For the purposes of fairness and efficiency, the FTC determined it 
would make rules to cover an identifiable segment of the economy rather than 
using piecemeal treatment through individual adjudication.52 
The effect on the FTC enforcement process of trade regulation rules, as 
opposed to guides, is to cut off the rights of those who challenge the conclu-
sions expressed in the rule in a subsequent cease and desist order proceeding. 53 
A person who has had notice and an opportunity to participate in the original 
rulemaking proceeding has no subsequent right to challenge the rule; the only 
right he retains is the right to allege that changed circumstances or other spe-
cial circumstances justify exemption from a rule in an individual case.s4 
From the time of the FTC's first promulgation of trade regulation rules, 
the argument has been made that the FTC was not originally delegated legis-
lative rulemaking authority.55 Moreover, those opposed to the trade regula-
47. E. ROCKEFELLER, DESK BOOK OF FfC PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 80 (2d ed. 1976). 
48. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY OF FEDERAL REGULATION, S. 
Doc. No. 72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977)("In certain kinds of enforcement agencies, though, 
such as the FfC, rulemaking is unlikely to be effective unless followed by case-by-case enforce-
ment.") [hereinafter cited as S. Doc. No. 72]. 
49. E. KINTNER, supra note 34, at 64. 
50. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §§ 408.1-.4 (1964)). 
51. Id 
52. Id at 8366-68. See also Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL 
L.Q. 678, 749-51 (1966). 
53. 16 C.F.R. § 1.22(c) (1982) provides, "Where a rule is relevant to any issue involved in an 
adjudicative proceeding thereafter instituted, the Commission may rely upon the rule to resolve 
such issue, provided that the respondent shall have been given a fair hearing on the applicability 
of the rule to a particular case." 
54. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(g) (1976). See National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FfC, 482 F.2d 672 
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974) ("[s]ome opportunity must be given for a de-
fendant • . . to demonstrate that the special circumstances of his case warrant waiving the rule's 
applicability''). See also Clagett, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent De-
velopments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DuKE L.J. 51, 81-83. 
55. See, e.g., Burras & Teter, Antitrust: Rulemaking v. Adjudication in the FTC, 54 Gao. L.J. 
1106 (1965); Weston, Deceptive Advertising and the Federal Trade Commission: JJecline oJ Caveat 
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tion rules argued that if the FTC were bestowed with legislative rulemaking 
power, it had to exercise that rulemaking authority by using formal, trial-type 
procedures. 56 Nonetheless, the controversy did not reach a court in a justicia-
ble form until nearly a decade later, in response to the promulgation of a rule 
compelling retail gasoline dealers to post the octane rating on the gasoline 
pumps. 57 
In National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC58 the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia affirmed the agency's legislative mlemaking au-
thority and its ability to make such rules through the informal notice and com-
ment process set out in section 553 of the AP A. The court found that section 
6(g) of the FTCA was sufficient delegation of authority to support the implica-
tion of legislative rulemaking authority.59 Congress later enacted the 
FTCIA,60 which specifically delegates to the agency the authority to promul-
gate legislative rules in the field of consumer protection,61 but requires the 
Emptor, 24 FED. B.J. 548, 568-73 (1964); Note, The FTC's Claim of Substa!Jtive Rule-Making 
Power: A Study in Opposition, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 330 (1972-73). These authorities misread 
the legislative debate on the original Federal Trade Commission Act. It is true that much of the 
debate involves the question whether the FTC would be delegated illegal "legislative" authority. 
51 CONG. REc. 14,938 (1914). Although this debate talks of"legislative authority," it involves the 
nondelegation doctrine and not rulemaking. The question was whether "unfair methods of com-
petition" is a sufficient standard to avoid the delegation of legislative authority. The sponsors· of 
the bill pointed to existing definitions of that term to show that it had sufficient meaning to pro-
vide an adequate standard for either adjudication or rulemaking. Indeed, the sponsors cited nu-
merous cases upholding the delegation of rulemaking authority to agencies then in existence. Id 
at 11,084-86 (remarks of Senator Newland); id at 14,930-33 (remarks of Representative Coving-
ton). Even better authority supported FTC rule making powers. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.04 (Supp. 1970); Auerback, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal 
Organization and Procedure, 48 MINN. L. REv. 383,457-59 (1964); Fuchs, Agency .Development of 
Policy Through Rule-making, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 781 (1964). See generally Baum, Reorganization, 
.Delay and the Federal Trade Commission, 15 Ao. L. REv. 92 (1963) (discussion of practical advan-
tages of rulemaking over adjudication). 
56. The argument ran that even if the FTC had legislative rulemaking authority, the FTCA 
required it to make its decisions only after a hearing. Thus, it was argued, a rule was "required by 
statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing" and§ 553(c) required 
such rules to be made through the formal processes of§§ 556-57 and not the informal procedures 
of§ 553. The Supreme Court soundly rejected this argument. See Federal Power Comm'n v. 
Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). 
57. Posting of Minimum Octane Numbers of Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 36 Fed. Reg. 
23,871 (1971) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 422.1), revoked by 43 Fed. Reg. 43,022 (1978). 
58. 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia, in American Nat'l Standards lnst., Inc. v. FTC, No. 79-
1275 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1982), recently rejected a bid by an industry group to reconsider the decision 
in National Petroleum Refiners. See 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1051, at 331 
(Feb. 11, 1982). The Court held that if Congress disapproved of the Court's interpretation of the 
FTC's powers, Congress could alter that power by rescinding the Commission's section 6(g) sub-
stantive rulemaking authority. The Court stated, "Congress has not taken the initiative to do so 
and it is inappropriate for this [c]ourt to do so." Id 
59. 482 F.2d at 681. 
60. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 
93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (1975) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). 
61. The Act prescribes hybrid procedures only for consumer protection rules and not for 
antitrust rules. Presumably, antitrust rules may still be promulgated under the authority of§ 6(g), 
15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (1975), which was upheld in Natio!Jal Petroleum Refiners, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 951 (1974), through§ 553 procedures. See American Nat'l Stan-
dards lnst., Inc. v. FTC, No. 79-1275 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1982); see also 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE 
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1051, at 331 (Feb. 11, 1982). 
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Commission to follow certain procedures in addition to basic informal 
rulemaking procedures of the AP A. 62 
Under the hybrid procedures of the FTCIA, the FTC begins the rulemak-
ing procedure with publication of the initial notice of proposed rulemaking.63 
At approximately the same time a presiding officer is designated by the Com-
mission to oversee the rulemaking process. 64 The presiding officer then ac-
cepts proposals from interested persons regarding issues upon which cross-
examination may be appropriate.65 At this time the FTC also accepts written 
submissions of data, views, and arguments about the proposed rule from per-
sons interested in the proceeding. 66 The next step in the rulemaking process is 
publication of the final notice of proposed rulemaking. 
Mter publication of the final notice of proposed rulemaking, the presid-
ing officer accepts applications from interested parties requesting a right of 
cross-examination during the forthcoming oral hearing stage of the proceed-
ing.67 The presiding officer may grant or deny the request. He may also des-
ignate one party to cross-examine on behalf of many parties if, in his view, 
62. Legislation was proposed in this Congress that would add a general requirement of pro-
cedures in addition to those currently required by the APA. SeeS. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 94 (1981); S. REP. No. 305, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981). 
63. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(Supp. IV 1980) states: 
(b) Procedures applicable 
(1) When prescribing a rule under subsection (a)(l)(B) of this section, the Commis-
sion shall proceed in accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code [5 USCS 
§ 553] (without regard to any reference in such section to sections 556 and 557 of such 
title [5 USCS §§ 556 and 557]), and shall also (A) publish a notice of proposed rulemak-
ing stating with particularity the text of the rule, including any alternatives, which the 
Commission proposes to promulgate, and the reason for the proposed rule; (B) allow 
interested persons to submit written data, views, and arguments, and make all such sub-
missions publicly available; (C) provide an opportunity for an informal hearing in ac-
cordance with subsection (c); and (D) promulgate, if appropriate, final rule based on the 
matter in the rulemaking record (as defined in subsection (e)(l)(B) of this section), to-
gether with a statement of basis and purpose. 
(2)(A) Prior to the publication of any notice of proposed rulemaking pursuant to 
paragraph (l)(A), the Commission shall publish an advance notice of proposed rulemak-
ing in the Federal Register. Such advance notice shall-
(i) contain a brief description of the area of inquiry under consideration, the obJec-
tives which the Commission seeks to achieve, and possible regulatory alternatives 
under consideration by the Commission; and 
(ii) invite the response of interested parties with respect to such proposed rulemak-
ing, including any suggestions or alternative methods for achieving such objectives. 
(B) The Commission shall submit such advance notice of proposed rulemaking to 
the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and to the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. The Commis-
sion may use such additional mechanisms as the Commission considers useful to obtain 
suggestions regarding the content of the area of inquiry before the publication of a gen-
eral notice of proposed rulemaking under paragraph (1 )(A). 
(C) The Commission shall, 30 days before the publication of a notice of proposed 
rulemaking pursuant to paragraph (1)(A), submit such notice to the Committee on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate and to the Committee on Energy and 
Commerce of the House of Representatives. 
64. 16 C.P.R. § 1.13(c) (1982). 
65. Id § l.ll(a)(4) (1982). 
66. Id § 1.11(a)(5). 
67. Id § 1.12(d) (1982). 
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those parties hold substantially similar views on the rulemaking proceeding. 68 
After completion of the oral hearing, the FTC allows interested parties a lim-
ited right to make rebuttal submissions.69 
After the oral hearing, the staff makes recommendations to the Commis-
sion in a report on the rulemaking record.7° After publication of the staff re-
port, the presiding officer recommends a decision based upon his or her 
findings and conclusions, and taking into account the staff report.71 Both of 
these reports are made public, and interested parties have a right to submit as 
part of the record comments on both the presiding officer's and the FTC staff's 
report.72 Finally, the entire rulemaking record is submitted to the Commis-
sion. The Commission promulgates a final rule, which is published in the Fed-
eral Register. The rule becomes effective on the fourth day after publication.73 
The FTCIA specifies that a final rule is subject to judicial review within 
sixty days upon the request of any interested person.74 The scope of the re-
view of FTCIA rulemaking is more stringent than that normally applied to 
section 553 rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act. When exam-
ining an FTCIA rulemaking proceeding, the court applies a substantial evi-
dence, rather than an arbitrary and capricious, standard of review.75 
Moreover, FTC rulings that limit the rights of participants to engage in cross-
examination and rebuttal specifically are made reversible error when such a 
limitation precludes the disclosure of disputed material facts.76 
In 1980 Congress modified the trade regulation rulemaking process 
through the enactment of the Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 
68. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(c)(4)(A)-(B) (Supp. IV 1980). 
69. Id § 57a(c)(2)(B). 
70. 16 C.F.R. § 1.13(1) (1982). 
71. Id § 1.13(g). 
72. Id § 1.13(h). 
73. Id § 1.14(c). 
74. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(l)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). This provision raises an interesting question. 
If an interested person fails to seek preenforcement review within the requisite time, has he lost 
the right to obtain review both prior to enforcement and at the time the rule is applied to him? 
See Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (failure to join as parties to rulemaking jeopar-
dizes right to seek direct appellate review); North Am. Pharmacal, Inc. v. HEW, 491 F.2d 546, 592 
(8th Cir. 1973) (failure to request hearing during time allowed resulted in refusal of review of 
order). See generally Stewart, The Refonnation o:f American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
1669, 1752-60 (1975). 
75. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). Normally under the APA the arbitrary and 
capricious standard applies to rulemaking. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). The Magnuson-Moss Act 
requires substantial evidence review but probably only as to adjudicative, not legislative facts. 
CONFERENCE REP. No. 93-1408, Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Conference, 93d 
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7755, 7766-67 ("In addition, the 
Court would set aside a rule under section 18 if it found that the findings and conclusions of the 
Commission with regard to disputed issues of material fact on which the rule is based are not 
supported by substantial evidence in the rulemaking record taken as a whole. Of course, this test 
would not apply to findings or determinations oflegislative fact."). S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 5 (1981) adds a new test for rulemaking: "without substantial support in the rulemaking file, 
viewed as a whole, for the asserted or necessary factual basis, as distinguished from the policy or 
legal basis, of a rule adopted in a proceeding subject to section 553 of this title." 
76. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(e)(3)(B)(i)-(ii) (1976). 
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1980.77 The Act establishes a legislative veto over the FTC's rulemaking ac-
tivities: Congress has ninety days to review a final trade regulation rule, and 
unless both the House and the Senate pass veto resolutions, the rule becomes 
effective ninety days after promulgation.78 The FTC may submit a revised 
rule to Congress if both Houses disapprove a final rule.79 
The 1980 Act also requires the FTC to alter some of the procedures previ-
ously used in the trade regulation rulemaking proceeding. Section 8 of the 
1980 Act requires the Commission, prior to the commencement of a rulemak-
ing proceeding, to publish an advance notice of proposed rulemaking.80 The 
advance notice must describe the proposed rule, the objectives sought to be 
achieved through enactment of the rule, and any alternatives to the rule under 
consideration by the agency.81 Moreover, section 8 requires the Commission 
to submit a notice of proposed rulemaking to the Senate and House Com-
merce Committees thirty days prior to publication in the Federal Register.82 
Section 15 of the 1980 Act requires the FTC to prepare and publish a 
preliminary regulatory analysis of the proposed rule setting forth the objec-
tives sought to be achieved from the enagtment of the rule. In addition, the 
preliminary regulatory analysis must delineate the perceived benefits, detri-
ments, and effects of the proposed rule on both the public and the industry 
regulated by the proposed rule. It must also delineate any reasonable alterna-
tives to the proposed rule. 83 
When the Commission promulgates and publishes a final rule, the agency 
simultaneously must issue a final regulatory analysis. 84 That analysis must in-
clude, in addition to the material required in the preliminary regulatory analy-
77. Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 57a, 57a-1, 57b-1, 57b-2, 
57b-3, 57b-4, 57c (Supp. IV 1980)). 
78. Other legislative veto provisions have been found to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Con-
sumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) petition for cert. filed sub 
nom United States Senate v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 51 U.S.L.W. 3099 (U.S. Aug. 17, 
1982) (No. 82-177) & United States House of Representatives v. Consumer Energy Council of 
Am., 51 U.S.L.W. 3120 (U.S. Aug. 24, 1982) (No. 82-209); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. 
v. Chadba, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 87 (1981). In Consumer Energy 
Council of Am. v. FERC a unanimous panel of the District of Columbia Circuit Court held that 
the one-house veto provision of the Natural Gas Policy Act was unconstitutional. The court 
found that "the one-house veto violates Article I, Section 7, both by preventing the President from 
exercising his veto and by permitting legislative action by only one house of Congress." 673 F.2d 
at 448. In addition, the court held that "the one-house veto contravenes the separation of powers 
principle implicit in Articles I, II, and III because it authorizes the legislature to share powers 
properly exercised by the other two branches." Id Incorporating its reasoning in Consumer En-
ergy Council, the D.C. Circuit held unconstitutional the two-house veto provision of§ 21(a) of the 
1980 Improvement Act, Consumer's Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 51 U.S.L.W. 2262 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 
22, 1982) (per curiam). Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadba is now before the United 
States Supreme Court for decision. Oral arguments were heard in late February 1982. 50 
U.S.L.W. 3687 (Mar. 2, 1982). 
79. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, § 21, IS U.S.C. § 57a-1(c) (Supp. 
IV 1980). 
80. Id., § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(l)(A). 
81. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(2){A)(i). 
82. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(b)(2)(C). 
83. Id., § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3. 
84. I d. The Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980) (codified at 5 
U.S. C.§§ 601-612 (Supp. IV 1980)), amends the APA to require cost/benefit analysis of the effects 
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sis, an explanation of the reasons the FTC chose the particular final 
alternative. The final regulatory analysis must also include a summary of the 
significant issues raised during the rulemaking proceeding along with the 
agency's responses thereto.85 
The 1980 enactment sets limits on the dollar amount of compensation that 
can be paid to individual outside participants in the rulemaking process. 86 
Section 10 further requires that the FTC set aside twenty-five percent of its 
intervenor funds for small business interests that participate in rulemaking 
proceedings at the FTC. 87 The Act also requires the FTC to d•;:velop a small 
business outreach program to encourage participation by small business inter-
ests in the rulemaking process. 88 
In both the original FTCIA and the 1980 Act, Congress gave interested 
parties greater participatory rights than it granted under the Administrative 
Procedure Act. Congress sought to restrict broad substantive delegation of 
authority to the FTC through the provision of procedural safeguards and limi-
tations. 89 Despite these increases in participatory rights and judicial and legis-
lative oversight, there presently exists a strong objection to FTC rulemaking 
within some governmental circles and the private sector. This criticism relates 
to both substantive and procedural aspects of recent FTC activities. Many feel 
that the Commission has overstepped its legislatively granted authority and is 
engaged in overregulation in areas in which it is without authotity to regulate. 
Procedural criticisms include the general failure to provide adequate par-
ticipatory opportunities, unmanageable rulemaking records, staff bias 
problems, insufficient issue designation, and the extensive and inflexible na-
ture of FTC compliance procedures.9o 
The primary vehicle for enhancing participatory rights is cross-examina-
of rulemaking on small businesses. President Reagan in Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.P.R. 127 
(1981), required cost/benefit analysis for all "major rules" no matter where their impact is felt. 
85. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 57b-3(b)(2) 
(Supp. IV 1980). 
86. Id, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(3). Section 10 limits the amount that each participant can 
receive to $75,000 per rulemaking proceeding and $50,000 per year per person for all ru1emaking 
activities. 
87. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(2). 
88. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 57a(h)(5). 
89. In the 1980 Act Congress not only provided procedural restraints on FTC rulemaking, 
but it also sought to limit the substantive scope of FTC rulemaking. This Act significantly restricts 
the authority of the FTC to regulate in the following areas: voluntary standards-making or certifi-
cation activities, id., § 7 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l)(B); children's advertising practices, id., § 11 15 
U.S.C. § 57a(i); and funeral industry practices, id, § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 57 a note. This portion of the 
statute limits the FTC regulatory power over the funeral industry to (a) mandatory price disclo-
sure, (b) banning deceptive and coercive practices; and (c) prohibiting unlawful practices. 
90. E. COX, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER REPORT'' ON THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION (1969); B. Boyer, M. Bowers, H. Toiv, D. Edelman, B. Cartwright, C. DeVita & J. 
Bennett, Trade Regulation Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal Trade Commission: A Report 
to the Administrative Conference of the United States by the Special Project for the Study of 
Rulemaking Procedures Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Act 
Parts I, III (May 1979) [hereinafter cited as Boyer Report]. This report was prepared for consider-
ation by the Committee on Rulemaking and Public Information of the Administrative Conference 
of the United States. It represents only the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the 
Conference, the Committee, or the Office of the Chairman. 
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tion. The utility of cross-examination in rulemaking has been debated for 
many years.91 Much of this debate has centered around the FTC rulemaking 
procedures. Proponents contend that cross-examination helps test the accu-
racy and integrity of information presented;92 opponents believe cross-exami-
nation fails to improve appreciably the information gathering process and 
only provides a delaying device for those attempting to avoid law enforce-
ment.93 While the efficacy of cross-examination in administrative proceedings 
is questioned by neutral observers,94 its contribution to delay in administrative 
decision making is equally questionable.95 In short, neither the costs nor the 
benefits of cross-examination seem as high as antagonists suggest. 
Delay, however, is a significant problem in the promulgation of trade reg-
ulation rules. The FTCIA additions to participatory rights seem to be a factor 
in that delay.96 The major cause may be no single factor or set of factors but 
rather the added spirit of adversarial confrontation inherent in hybrid 
rulemaking. Many members of the FTC rulemaking staff and private partici-
pants have proved overcommitted to their particular interests rather than com-
mitted to working together towards a mutually satisfactory result. Also 
important, however, is that after National Petroleum Refiners the FTC began 
considering rulemaking in more important areas of the economy than in those 
to which it had previously directed its efforts. Persons affected by these rules 
had both the inclination and resources to fight the FTC. They could, in fact, 
carry this fight to the Congress.97 Consequently, the new procedural opportu-
nities and contentious postures of the participants created a significant impedi-
ment to FTC legislative rulemaking. A more cooperative procedure could 
lead to more efficient rulemaking efforts at the Commission and hence greater 
91. See, e.g., Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability, I C.F.R. 
§ 305.72-5 (1982). 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 380-81 (1958); Hamilton, Proce· 
dures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in 
Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1276 (1972). See also 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE 475 (2d ed. 1978) ("The fundamental movement away from rulemaking on the 
record [trial-type rulemaking] has been strong and persuasive."). 
92. See, e.g., Austem, Food Standards: The Balance Between Certainty and Innovation, 24 
FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 440 (1969); Ross, The Big Administrative Proceeding: A ReSjJonse to Mr. 
Westwood, 51 A.B.A. J. 239 (1965); Zwerdling, A Plea for Clemency for Cross Examination, 57 
A.B.A. J. 45 (1971). Cf. Clagget, Informal Action-Adjudication-Rulemaking: Some Recent .De· 
velopments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51; Robinson, The Making of Adminls· 
trative Policy, Another Laok at Rulemaking and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. 
REv. 485 (1970). 
93. See, e.g., Westwood, Administrative Proceedings: Techniques of Presiding, 50 A.B.A. J. 659 
(1964). 
94. See, e.g., Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1306 n.I99 (1975). E. 
PRETTYMAN, TRIAL BY AGENCY 30-35 (1959) questions the value of cross-examination even in 
formal agency adjudications. 
95. S. Doc. No. 72, supra note 48, at 32-33. See Dixon, Rulemaking and the Myth of Cross 
Examination, 34 AD. LAW REV. 389, 422-23 (1982). 
96. Trade Regulation Rulemaking Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade 
Commission Improvement Act, I C.F.R. § 305.80-1 (1982). 
97. This fact is evidenced by the restraints in substantive authority included in the Federal 
Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374 (1980) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 57a, 57a-l, 57b-l, 57b-2, 57b-3, 57b-4, 57c (Supp. IV 1980)). 
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use of rulemaking through negotiation rather than through th€: use of adver-
sarial techniques. 
These added procedural safeguards also affect the compilation of a 
rulemaking record.98 The rulemaking record was intended to demonstrate the 
Commission's reasoning process in a particular rulemaking proceeding and to 
provide a basis for meaningful judicial review. A process for developing a 
complete record would improve the final agency decision and provide a mech-
anism for court supervision of the FTC rulemaking process. Thus, the institu-
tion of a hybrid procedure was designed to heighten the process of reasoned 
decisionmaking; the rulemaking record was envisioned as the cornerstone of a 
system designed to ensure a reasoned resolution of material factual issues.9 9 
In reality, however, the rulemaking record is widely acknowledged to be 
unmanageably massive and convoluted.100 As a result, the informal hearings 
stage of the proceedings becomes a motions practice. Moreover, the sheer 
bulk and unmanageability of the record makes the task of mastering the rec-
ord expensive and difficult. For participants who are unable to overcome the 
time and cost constraints imposed by the record, the record may reduce the 
efficacy of their participation. As a practical matter, the prehearing record is 
ignored by participants in the rulemaking process. 101 
Difficulties in using the record contribute to a tendency of the FTC staff 
and the participants to treat the successive stages of the rulemaking process as 
independent episodes. Consequently, participants submit data and argument 
with little reference to the record in earlier phases of the proceeding. This 
segmentation creates delay, reduces efficiency, and increases th1~ overall cost of 
the agency's rulemaking procedure.102 Moreover, an inaccessible rulemaking 
record may jeopardize a rule on judicial review; the record may be so func-
tionally inadequate that it justifies judicial invalidation of the rule.103 
The problem of overformalizing rulemaking procedure is aggravated by 
the inherent impossibility of settling a rule without going through the entire 
rulemaking process. Unlike adjudication, the diversity of potential partici-
pants in rulemaking compels the agency to play out the process to its end. 
Even if those directly affected by the rule can agree prior to process comple-
tion, inchoate interests could later object to any incomplete procedures, thus 
jeopardizing the rule. Similarly, even if all the directly interested parties 
waived some procedural element, that element could not safely be eliminated 
without endangering the rule. More importantly, the agency could not work a 
compromise through persuasion or tradeoffs, either on substantive issues or in 
the rulemaking procedure, with confidence that the agreement would stand in 
the future. In contrast, such conduct is standard practice in adjudication. For 
98. Boyer Report, supra note 90, Part I, at 7, Part III. 
99. ld. Part I, at 7. 
100. ld. Part III. 
101. See id. 
102. ld. 
103. ld. 
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this reason the inflexible procedural constraints on rulemaking are potentially 
more dangerous and counterproductive than they might be in adjudication. In 
adjudication there is a kind of marketplace of procedure in which the parties 
can bargain about procedures. Persons involved in rulemaking are locked into 
the mandated procedure without hope of escape. The trade regulation rule 
process of the FTC is a prime example of this problem.104 
Staff bias in favor of a proposed rule adds to the adversarial nature of the 
proceeding and arguably also reduces its effectiveness by inhibiting coopera-
tion between the government, consumers, and industry groups. 105 Many be-
lieve that a staff which investigates a problem, drafts a proposed rule, and has 
invested a substantial amount of time and effort in support of a proposed rule 
naturally will be hostile to an industry or consumer position that opposes that 
rule or supports another rule. One of the problems with FTC rulemaking is 
the perception, and in many cases the reality, of staff closedmindedness at the 
time other actors in the rulemaking proceeding express their views about a 
particular rule and its altematives.106 Again, a process built on cooperation 
and negotiated settlement of conflicts would alleviate much of the hostility 
caused by this perception. 
The FTC is also criticized for its failure to articulate the substantive issues 
and the legal theories behind a proposed trade regulation rule. 107 In most 
rulemaking proceedings the initial documents, notices, rule provisions, and 
staff reports are vague; they rarely delineate what the FTC is doing and why. 
As a result, industry members and consumer groups alike remain in the dark 
about what question is in issue and on what theories to proceed during the 
rulemaking process. Furthermore, this vagueness makes it difficult for partici-
pants to know what kind of evidence to submit in support or opposition of a 
proposed trade regulation rule.108 The free exchange of views through the 
process of negotiation would greatly increase the sense that the regulatory 
problems were identified and faced by the agency before a final rule was 
promulgated. 
104. For example, some rulemaking presiding officers have found that the issue designation 
approach required by the Act, id. Part I, at 8-16, was difficult to implement, so they developed a 
practice of permitting the parties to cross-examine on any issues in exchange for their promise not 
to exceed certain time limits. This approach has been criticized. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TREATISE§ 6.21 (2d ed. 1978). Davis suggests that the excessive use of cross-examination by 
the FTC is wasteful and that Congress intended to limit cross-examination to issues of specific 
fact. Davis further suggests that the excessive use of cross-examination under FTCIA may indi-
cate to Congress that its experiment with limited cross-examination has failed. Davis believes that 
the end result of this FTC abuse may be a move towards rulemaking procedure that provides no 
opportunity for cross-examination. I d. See also Kestenbaum, Rulemaking Beyond A.P.A.: Criteria 
for Trial-Type Procedures and the FTC Improvement Act, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 679 (1976). 
105. Critique of the Administrative Conference Report on Federal Trade Commission Rulemak-
ing, 48 ANTITRUST LJ. 1753, 1776-78 (i980) (panel discussion) [hereinafter cited as Critique]. 
106. Id. 
107. See Boyer Report, supra note 90, Part I. 
108. See id. at 40-44. Boyer concludes that if the Commission remains free to frame broad 
and novel theories to support its rules, to decide issues on a best estimate basis from an inconclu-
sive record, and to rely on a wide variety of evidence to support its conclusions, then the proce-
dural safeguards incorporated in the statute seem illusory. I d. at 45. 
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The major substantive criticism of the FTC trade regulation rule practice 
is its failure to apply rulemaking to the appropriate industries or practices. 
For example, the FTC seems to disregard the pervasiveness of an alleged de-
ceptive or unfair business practice.109 The FTC is perceived as taking the 
stance that some practices are sufficiently destructive to require preventive reg-
ulation regardless of the actual prevalence of the practice within an industry. 
Although FTC prohibition of widely used deceptive trade practices through 
rulemaking procedures is generally regarded as appropriate, many critics of 
the FTC find fault with the agency's imposition of a trade regulation rule 
when a practice is only employed by a few members of an industry. Obvi-
ously, the less pervasive the practice, the more the FTC imposes unnecessary 
regulatory requirements on those innocent members of an industry. 110 Many 
argue that rulemaking, especially in the later proceedings, becomes a device 
"to restrict the lawful activities oflaw obeyers so as not to discriminate against 
law breakers."111 Congress intended that rulemaking be used to attack perva-
sive practices within an industry; thus the legitimacy of the agency's rulemak-
ing activity is undercut when rulemaking is used to regulate only a few 
members of the industry. Moreover, many of the remedies imposed on indus-
try by the FTC require extensive, detailed changes in the way an industry does 
business. Extensive, inflexible compliance specifications are inappropriate 
when prescribed on an industry-wide basis, particularly when the practices are 
followed by only a few members of the industry. The prescription of extensive 
compliance procedures is more realistic and appropriate when imposed in an 
individual context.112 This criticism has particular relevance because it is ex-
actly these industries against which negotiated rules will be easiest and most 
effectively enforced: The majority of the industry already agrees on what the 
standard of conduct should be; they would be likely to help police the rule 
after promulgation.• 13 
B. Rulemaking through Negotiation 
Several factors have contributed to the failure of the FTC legislative 
rulemaking effort. Many of these factors concern the relationship of the rules 
to the affected industries. The rules fail to incorporate adequately business 
109. See Kirkpatrick, F.T.C Ru!emaking in Historical Perspective, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1561, 
1563 (1980); Critique, supra note 105; Boyer Report, supra note 90, Part I, at 37-39. 
110. Id. 
Ill. Kirkpatrick, supra note 109, at 1563. Miles Kirkpatrick, former Chairman of the FTC, 
suggests that the addition of adjudicatory expertise and procedures to FTC rulemaking·would 
serve partially to solve the rulemaking procedural problems faced by the FTC. Kirkpatrick states: 
The appointment of an AU to control the proceedings and to render a report in the 
nature of an initial decision would help address the 'procedural problems of issue formu-
lation and refinement, organization, and presentation of evidence, management of the 
record, and would help to guarantee all participants a complete and neutral weighing of 
the evidence. 
Id. at 1569. 
112. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 109; Critique, supra note 105, at 1788-94. 
113. For a practical guide to trade regulation rule procedure, see S. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE 
CoMMISSION§§ 6.02-6.07 (1981). 
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reality and thereby force business interests to resist the rulemaking and the 
final rules. The FTC procedures, especially as modified, give industry sub-
stantial opportunity to challenge the rule but actually diminish the industry's 
commitment to the final product. The rulemaking takes longer than necessary 
because business interests use every tool available to slow down the process. 
This delay in tum accounts for much of the dissatisfaction among consumer 
representatives. The absence of business commitment to the final rule also 
threatens actual, as opposed to formal, compliance with a rule. More industry 
commitment, therefore, may be a necessary corollary to successful FTC 
rulemaking. These defects suggest that FTC rulemaking requires a technique 
which not only assures adequate incorporation of legitimate business realities 
but also involves industry members in a way that will enhance their commit-
ment to the final rules. I I4 The FTC at one time had such a rulemaking proce-
dure-rules resulting from trade practice conferences. 
The "trade practice submittal," which later became known as the "trade 
practice conference,"II5 was the agency's first effort at industry-wide regula-
tion. I I6 Prior to the implementation of the trade practice conference program, 
the FTC brought only individual adjudicatory (cease and desist) proceedings 
against those who violated the s!atutes under its jurisdiction. The weakness of 
individual adjudication to bring about policy changes led the FTC to develop 
an industry-wide'voluntary compliance program designed to attack industry-
wide problems through the use of the trade practice submittal procedure.ll 7 
The first trade practice submittal took place in 1919. The FTC had re-
ceived numerous complaints about certain common practices in the gold filled, 
gold plated, and gold shell jewelry industry. us As a result, the FTC called an 
industry-wide conference. Discussion between industry members and the 
FTC staff resulted in promulgation of simple rules prohibiting several preva-
114. Group behavior research sees one of the goals of participation as the fostering of cooper-
ation. See, e.g., R. DUBIN, THE WORLD OF WORK: INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND HUMAN RELA· 
TIONS 243-44 (1958). 
115. The name of the procedure was changed to trade practice conference in 1926 when the 
FrC created a separate trade practice confere!}ce division. 
116. For example, the first conference to be designated with the title "trade practice submittal" 
was the conference of the book and writing-paper industry in 1919. The Commission promul-
gated four rules: (l) that papers were not to be labelled "handmade" unless actually made by that 
process; (2) that papers were not to be labelled with the name of a fabric unless qualifying words 
were used to show that the name described the finish only, e.g., "Linen Finish" or "Nainsook 
Finish"; (3) that foreign geographical names were not to be used to designate papers of domestic 
manufacture without the addition of qualifying phrases such as "Made in U.S.A."; and (4) that 
the word "parchment" was not to be used without qualifying words to indicate its true character 
such as "vegetable parchment," or "imitation parchment." Kittelle & Mostow, A Review of tire 
Trade Practice Co'!forences of the FTC, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 427, 429-30 (1940). 
117. See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION; A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND PROCEDURE (1924); C. MCFARLAND, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, 1920-1930 (1933); S. WAGNER, THE 
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1971); Comment, supra note 38, at 916-17. 
118. The participants in the gold shell conference agreed that no mark or brand designating 
gold value or wearing quality should be used, except "[t]he words 'gold shell' preceded by the 
designation of the alloy of gold used in shell, which shall be preceded by a fraction designating the 
correct proportion of the weight of the shell to the weight of the entire ring; illustrated by 1/10 14-
K gold shell." Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 429 (quoting FrC Release of Nov. 25, 1918). 
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lent deceptive industry practices.119 
In 1926 the FTC created a separate Trade Practice Conference Division 
to deal with the increasing requests for trade practice confeJ,"ences.120 In the 
mid-1930s the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA) procedures usurped 
most of the functions of the Trade Practice Conference Division of the FTC. 
When the Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional, 121 the FTC 
again began to regulate actively through use of the trade practice conference 
device.122 In 1946 the FTC created a Rules Administration Unit within the 
Trade Practice Conference Division.123 The FTC stopped using the trade 
practice conference procedure in the mid-1960s; the procedure was formally 
abolished in 1979.124 
Although the actual trade practice conference procedure was occasionally 
altered by the FTC, the basic procedure can be simply and accurately de-
scribed. Written application for initiation of a trade practice conference could 
be made by industry, consumers, or the Commission. Once received, the writ-
ten request was studied by attorneys on the staff of the Trade Practice Confer-
ence Division who were required to recommend to the Commission whether to 
grant or deny the conference request. 125 
If the Commission granted the request for the trade practice conference, 
the application was referred back to the Trade Practice Conference Division, 
which then began preparations for the conference. Attorneys gathered infor-
mation about the allegedly deceptive or unfair practices, and practices of the 
industry in general, from a wide variety of sources within government, indus-
try, and trade associations, and from consumers. After gathering sufficient in-
formation, the staff attorneys responsible for conducting the conference 
drafted a proposed set of industry rules; their task often was accomplished 
with substantial input from an industry-appointed committee.126 After the 
draft rules were completed, all members of the industry and any other inter-
ested persons identified by the agency were given notice of the meeting and 
were invited to attend.127 At this time the FTC made available to the confer-
ence participants the draft rules together with a statement and explanation of 
the FTC's position on the proposed rule.12s 
At the conference the rules proposed by the FTC were discussed by all 
119. I d. at 429-30. 
120. 1926 FTC ANN. REP. 47-48. 
121. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935). 
122. Kitte~e & Mostow, supra note 116, at 432-33. 
123. 1946 FTC ANN. REP. 2, 4. 
124. 4 TRADE REo. REP. (CCH) ~ 41,003 (1979). "In 1979 the FTC ended the device of the 
'trade practice rule' .••• During the 1970's the Commission abolished the industry committee 
rule, then began rescinding trade practice rule [sic) until the few remaining were converted to the 
status of 'guides.'" I d. 
125. 16 C.F.R. § 2.24(b)-(c) (1939). Prior to 1946, as a practical matter, almost all requests for 
trade practice conferences came from industry groups. 
126. Co=ent, supra note 38, at 922-23. 
127. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.24(e) (1939). 
128. Co=ent, supra note 38, at 924. 
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participants. In light of this discussion, the trade practice conference staff pre-
pared another set of rules that were then submitted to the Commissioners for 
preliminary approva1. 129 If the rules were approved by the Commission, a 
public hearing would be held in which the FTC, the industry, and the public 
discussed the proposed rules. 130 If the public hearing revealed no need for 
substantial change in the proposed rules, the initial rules became final. The 
final rules were published in the Federal Register and mailed to industry 
members. 131 
Final trade practice conference rules were divided into two categories: 
Group I rules and Group II rules. 132 Group II rules codified practices that the 
industry recommended as demonstrative of ethical business practice; they 
were not, however, treated by the FTC as a definitive statement of the law. 133 
Group I rules were the crucial rules resulting from trade practice conferences 
and represented the opinion of the FTC as to the requirements of the federal 
laws that it administered.134 Group I rules were further subdivided into two 
sub-categories: "boilerplate" provisions and rules of specific application.13S 
"Boilerplate" rules were broadly written, standardized statements de-
lineating trade practices that were generally believed to be unfair or deceptive. 
Common "boilerplate" provisions include prohibition against commercial 
bribery, enticement of the employees of a competitor, obtaining confidential 
information of a competitor through deceptive means, and disparagement of a 
competitor's products. 136 Boilerplate rules primarily served to codify then ex-
isting statutory and decisional law. 
129. Id. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.24(e) (1939). 
130. 16 C.F.R. § 2.24(f) (1939). 
131. Id § 2.24(g). 
132. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 428-29; McCarty, Trade Practice Co'!(erences, 2 
CoRP. PRAc. REv., June 1930, 19, 22; Comment, supra note 38, at 925. The Director of the Trade 
Practice Conference Division described the rules as follows: 
Resolutions which are intended to define, denounce and eliminate practices which are in 
and of themselves illegal or if affirmatively approved by the Commission, classed by it as 
Group I rules; resolutions which are intended to define, denounce and eliminate prac-
tices which are not in and of themselves illegal but which nevertheless are retlarded by 
the trade as wasteful, harmful or otherwise bad, if accepted by the Commission as ex-
pressions of the trade, are classified as Group II rules. Resolutions which if put into 
effect would violate the law do not become rules but are rejected by the Commission. 
McCarty, supra, at 23. 
133. Id. 
134. K.ittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 428-29; McCarty, supra note 132, at 23; Comment, 
supra note 38, at 925-26; Note, supra note 22, at 390-91. 
135. Modem rules dealing with deceptive practices and unfair competition range from 
highly generalized to highly particularized specifications of business behavior. A large 
portion of the trade rules now in force consist of standard provisions cataloging practices 
which have long been held illegal under the statutes enforced by the Commission. These 
"boiler plate" provisions, repeated verbatim in code after code, deal largely with such 
unfair methods of competition as commercial bribery, disparagement of competitors' 
products, circulation of false and misleading price tests and price tags, use of lottery 
schemes in retail distribution, and many other common forms of unfair or deceptive 
practices. The meat of the rules, however, is continued in "custom-made" provisions 
patterned to control local practices in a particular industry. 
Comment, supra note 38, at 926-27. 
136. Id. at 926-27 & nn.l03-07. 
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Specific application rules, on the other hand, were custom-made to deal 
with practices peculiar to a particular industry. They were designed to be 
readily applicable to specific business problems of the committee regulated 
industry. 137 Specific rules were found to be especially valuable when applied 
to an emerging or rapidly expanding industry. They were also valuable in 
stemming emerging, but not yet entrenched, unfair trade practices within an 
industry.138 
After trade practice conference rules were promulgated, participating in-
dustry members were furnished with "acceptance cards" on which they were 
encouraged to register their assent to an intention to observe the rules estab-
lished by the FTC.139 The Rules Administration Division of th•~ Trade Prac-
tice Conference Division was charged with the responsibilty of monitoring 
compliance with enacted trade practice conference rules.140 The enforcement 
procedures employed by the Rules Administration Division were flexible and 
informal.141 The primary enforcement emphasis was on informal field visits, 
correspondence, and office conferences. 142 One commentator stated: 
While firms often maintain stoutly that their challenged conduct is 
not illegal, the Unit is usually able to persuade businessmen to mod-
ify their practices in a way which is satisfactory to the FTC. Such 
changes in behavior can be obtained by presenting far less evidence 
and factual data than would be required to justify the issuance of a 
cease and desist order or even a formal complaint. Ease of enforce-
ment, however, often depends on the type of rule involved. Business-
men comply more readily with a specific "custom-made" rule 
developed especially for the industry than with the generalized "boil-
erplate" provisions. The latter are open to more disputes over inter-
pretation . . . .143 
When informal administrative action failed to secure compliance with a trade 
practice conference rule by an industry member, the case was referred by the 
Rules Administration Division to the Bureau of Antideceptive Practices for 
formal action.144 
137. ld. at 927-28. 
138. Note, st~pra note 22, at 392. 
139. Co=ent, st~pra note 38, at 931 & n.124. 
140. I d. at 932; Note, st~pra note 22, at 393 & n.92. See also 1947 FTC Al\"N. REP. 4, 71. 
141. Co=ent, st~pra note 38, at 933. 
142. ld 
143. ld. at 933-34. 
144. ld. at 933-34 & n.l44. Like industry guides, see Sllpra text accompanying notes 26-48, 
trade practice rules were not intended to have the force of law, and their conclusion had to be 
supported in the record of any enforcement proceeding. See, e.g., Northern Feather Works, Inc. 
v. FTC, 234 F.2d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 1956), in which the court said: 
(T]rade practice rules were not taken as legal co=ands by the hearing c:xaminer, the 
Commission or ourselves. But we think that a set of rules worked out in conference 
between a government agency and an industry can be taken as a guide if, to those re-
sponsible for enforcement, they are reasonable and fair. 
Id at 338. 
This is the current approach taken by the FI'C in enforcement proceedings: 
In this an adjudicatory proceeding the Trade Practice Rules and Guides must be given 
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Commentators differ in their opinions of the effectiveness of the trade 
practice conference program. To make an objective judgment, many variables 
must be examined, including the specific rule involved, the industry involved, 
the type of rule involved, FTC enforcement monitoring procedures, consumer 
and industry monitoring procedures, and the susceptibility of the particular 
violation to discovery. The FTC and some commentators conclude, based 
largely on a survey of industry responses to official FTC questionnaires, that 
trade practice conference rules had a substantial regulatory effect on industry 
behavior.145 One confidential industry survey indicates, however, that when 
government, industry, or consumer pressure to comply with trade practice 
conference rules was absent, the trade practice conference rules, especially 
those promulgated before 1945, were ineffective. 
Some of the early trade practice conference rules and submittals are 
viewed as having been particularly ineffective.146 Most of these early rules 
consisted primarily of broadly worded Group II rules and "boilerplate" 
Group I provisions; they, therefore, had only a minimal educational or regula-
tory impact on industry behavior. In fact, several of the rules promulgated in 
the 1920s were in effect promulgated by industry with only minimal FTC in-
volvement. This unique form of industry self-regulation ended in the early 
1930s when the United States Justice Department criticized the FTC for aid-
ing and abetting industry violation of the antitrust laws.l47 
Trade practice rules promulgated in later years often were ineffective be-
cause they were written vaguely. From 1959 through 1961 the FTC, for exam-
ple, conducted trade practice conferences and promulgated rules for six 
different industries.148 These rules were in many respects identical: all six sets 
of rules were composed largely of standard prohibitions repeated in each rule 
and guide. These provisions were vaguely worded, "boilerplate" admonitions 
to industry not io engage in "bad" acts. The rules did little, however, to assist 
either members of an industry or consumers in discerning or correctly solving 
the effect which the Commission prescribes for them, not as "a substitute for evidence," 
but "as administrative interpretations having no force or effect as substantive law." 
"They serve to inform the public and the bar of the interpretation which the Commis-
sion, unaided by further consumer testimony or other evidence, will place upon adver-
tisements using the words and phrases therein set out." 
Surrey Sleep Prods., Inc., 73 FTC 523,531 (1968) (quoting Gimbel Bros., Inc., 61 FTC 1051, 1073 
(1962)). See also Wilmington Chern. Corp., 69 FTC 828, 885 n.31 (1966) ("In L!fetime Cutlery [56 
FTC 1648, 1649 (1959)], Trade Practice Rules were denied probative weight. Government coun-
sel had sought a finding that respondents' [practice] was deceptive simply on the basis of Trade 
Practice Rules. The Commission upheld the hearing examiner in refusing to so rule and re-
manded the case for further evidence.") As these cases suggest, however, trade practice rules are 
not without effect and were used by courts to help define the law. Fashion Originators' Guild of 
Am. Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 459 (1941). 
145. See STAFF OF SENATE TEMPORARY NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMM., 76TH CONO., 3D 
SESS., MONOGRAPH No. 34, CONTROL OF UNFAIR COMPETITIVE PRACTICES THROUGH TRADE 
PRACTICE CONFERENCE PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 1 (Comm. Print 
1941); Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 449-50. 
146. Nelson, Trade Practice Conftrence Rules and the Consumer, 8 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 452, 
467 (1940); see Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 434-38. 
147. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 436-37; Comment, supra note 38, at 939. 
148. Note, supra note 22, at 391. 
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industry violations of the statutes under the FTC's jurisdiction.149 
Many commentators, while condemning the "boilerplate" rule provisions, 
recognize the value of a rule specifically fashioned to address the problems 
and meet the needs of a particular industry. If a trade practice conference rule 
offers industry and consumers rational, well-defined standards of what consti-
tutes unacceptable and acceptable conduct with regard to a particular practice 
or set of practices, both the industry and consumers benefit. Effective protec-
tion is afforded when prohibitions are phrased in terms directly applicable to 
the specific practices of the industry in question; specific provisions serve both 
to crystallize a standard of industry behavior and to simplify the agency's task 
of administering the rule. One of the major criticisms of the trade practice 
program was its reliance on voluntary compliance. Indeed, some critics of the 
voluntary compliance programs have accused the FTC of tacit collusion with 
business interests.150 On occasion, however, government/industry coopera-
tion and voluntary compliance did work even when the industry was subject to 
substantial regulation. The textile rules, which required informational label-
ling on many different types of textiles, represent an early effort by the FTC to 
regulate on an industry-wide basis that had a substantial effect on industry 
trade practices.151 The textile industries traditionally were relu<:tant to coop-
erate with efforts to end deceptive practices within the industry. Industry 
members finally were convinced to cooperate with regulatory attempts as a 
'result of pressure brought to bear by consumer groups.152 
Several controversial sets of trade practice conference rules resulted from 
the textile industry conferences. The Rayon Industry Rules, for €:xample, were 
vigorously opposed by members of the rayon industry. The FTC rejected a set 
of rules submitted by the rayon industry; instead, the FTC substituted its own 
set of proconsumer rules. The Rayon Rules, as the Silk Rules promulgated a 
year later, required detailed affirmative representation about fiber content. 153 
This affirmative disclosure requirement went beyond then existing common 
law requirements.154 Evidence indicates that the various textile rules had a 
149. Id. at 391-92. 
150. See, eg., E. Cox, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, supra note 90, at 60-64. 
151. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 439-44; see generally Kittelle & Campbell, Power of 
the Federal Trade Commission to Require I11formative Labelilzg of Textiles, 20 B.U.L. REV. 23 
(1940). 
152. Comment, supra note 38, at 940-41 & n.l87. 
153. The requirement of informative labelling is best illustrated by Rule 1 of the Rayon 
Rules which states that it is an unfair trade practice not only to label rayon as not being 
rayon, or as being something other than rayon, but also to offer it for sale ''without 
disclosure of the fact that such material or product is rayon." 
Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 439. This provision was also incorporated by reference in 
the following trade practice conference rules: Popular Price Dress Manufacturing Industry; House 
Dress and Wash Frock Manufacturing Industry; Infants and Children's Knitted Outwear Indus-
try; and Ribbon Industry. Id at 439 n.67. The labelling requirements of the textile rules were 
quite detailed. Rule 6 of the Rayon Rules specifies that fabric fiber content shall be listed in order 
of predominance by weight. Rule 6 further requires revelation of the actual pertcentage of the 
fiber used in the fabric where any listed fiber represents less than 5% of the fabric by weight. Id at 
439. 
154. See id at 447-49. 
' 
300 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
substantial impact on the manner in which the textile industry conducted 
business. 155 
The textile rules represent an early instance in which consumer groups 
had a marked influence on the promulgation of industry rules.156 Moreover, 
the rules were finally adopted over industry objection. Nevertheless, evidence 
indicates that the textile industries complied with the rules once promulgated, 
despite their initial opposition. It appears clear, then, that not all voluntary 
compliance procedures serve industry interests at the expense of public inter-
est. In this instance, as well as many others, the FTC, the industry, and con-
sumers came together, albeit reluctantly, to make rules with which industry 
complied.157 
The other major criticism of the trade practice conference rule procedure 
focuses on the enforcement attention given to the rules after promulgation. A 
successful regulation program based on voluntary compliance must be sup-
ported by the forthright and persistent application of enforcement tools.I5s 
Unless enforcement action is applied consistently, trade practice rules can 
have only a limited effect on business behavior.l59 
Untill946 the FTC did not have a division formally charged with moni-
toring and administering the trade practice conference rules. With the addi-
tion of the Rules Administration Division in 1946, the FTC established a 
formal mechanism with staff assigned specifically to administer rules. Com-
mentators generally agree that the addition of the Rules Administration Divi-
155. Co=ent, supra note 38, at 940-41 & n.l87. 
156. Although the New York Board of Trade attempted to institute voluntary reform proce-
dures, such efforts were unsuccessful. The textile rules conferences were called primarily because 
of the pressure brought to bear on the Commission by consumer groups led by the New York City 
Federation of Women's Clubs. Textile industry groups were pressured into participating in the 
trade practice conference proceedings by retailers who in tum were pressured into participating in 
the proceedings by consumers. Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 116, at 441. 
157. Id. at 441-43. Occasionally industry groups and representatives advocated industry self-
regulation as an alternative to government regulation. See, e.g., Filene, Voluntary Control of Un-
foir Business Practices, 17 HARV. Bus. REv. 434 (1939); see generally Heermance, Self-Regulation 
and the Law, 10 HARV. Bus. REv. 420 (1932). Filene suggested that industry self-regulation could 
be achieved by industries acting in cooperation with the FTC; the FTC was to serve as the "final 
federal enforcing agency." Filene, supra, at 440. This self-regulation was to be accomplished in a 
several step process. First, each facet of the industry, manufacturers, wholesalers, and retailers, 
would meet separately to prepare a detailed list of prevalent unfair business practices in need of 
control or elimination. Second, all facets would meet together to agree on a master list of undesir-
able practices; all participants would then assent to abstain from the listed practices. Third, a 
clearing house would be set up to monitor compliance and take appropriate action against viola-
tors, backed by the cooperation between the clearing house and the FTC. Filene, supra, at 440. 
The author states: 
It has often been said that there can be no enforcement of a law or of an agreement 
unless there is some ultimate penalty in the background. But the constant reporting of 
code violations to the clearing house; the constant pressure from the clearing house on 
violations; and the fact that persistent violations are recorded by the clearing house and 
may be reported to the Federal Trade Commission-these factors should result in a 
moral pressure on the "chiseling minority" to mend its ways and conform to the agreed-
on code of ethics of the industry. 
Id. at 441. . 
158. S. Doc. No. 72, supra note 48, at 36. 
159. Id at 41-43. 
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sion had some effect on industry compliance.160 The Division, however; has 
been criticized for not being equal to the task. Severe manpower and funding 
limitations prevented the unit from being more than marginally effective. 161 
Although failure to enforce the trade practice rules was a major defect in 
the system, there is no evidence that the Commission is currently enforcing 
trade regulation rules any more rigorously. There have been few complaints 
raising violations of trade regulation rules and no hearings. Though the 
FTCIA permits the FTC to go directly to court to obtain an injunction against 
violations of its rules, the FTC rarely has done so, and it is doubtful that the 
next few years will find it exercising this authority.162 Thus, while improved 
enforcement would make rulemaking a more potent law enforcement tool, im-
proved enforcement is dependent on the type of rule employed by the FTC. 
On the other hand, the adversarial nature of the trade regulation rules process 
creates a lesser likelihood of voluntary compliance; therefore, negotiated rules 
seem preferable if limited enforcement is likely. 
II. IMPLEMENTING A SYSTEM INCORPORATING RULEMAKING 
THROUGH NEGOTIATION 
The challenge of FTC regulation is finding procedures that are acceptable 
to the factions affected by the agency's regulatory decisions. At the same time, 
any widely used procedure must provide a balanced regulatory structure 
through which the FTC can effectively fulfill its legislatively assigned task of 
regulating the practices of American business. 
Each procedure previously discussed-trade practice conference rules, in-
dustry guides, and trade regulation rules-possesses advantages and disadvan-
tages. The chief criticisms raised regarding the voluntary compliance 
procedures are their lack of actual regulatory effect, whether as a result of tacit 
collusion between industry and government, lack of enforcement, or ineffec-
tual regulatory standards. The primary criticisms of the current trade regula-
tion rulemaking procedure revolve around what is often described as 
overregulation or insensitive regulation imposed upon industry. The task is to 
devise a scheme that avoids overregulation but that at the same time effec-
tively accomplishes the agency's regulatory goal. 
To accomplish these divergent objectives, the FTC should institute a pro-
cedure consciously employing each rulemaking process when it can be used 
most efficiently. The first, and usual, method of regulation would be accom-
plished through negotiated rulemaking using a modified trade practice confer-
ence rulemaking procedure.163 Yet the agency's other two rulemaking 
160. Co=ent, stipra note 38, at 941-43; Note, stipra note 22, at 393. 
161. Co=ent, stipra note 38, at 942-43. 
162. S. Doc. No. 72, stipra note 48, at 41-43. 
163. The Administrative Conference of the United States is considering a proposal that rec-
o=ends creation of a supplemental negotiation rulemaking procedure designed to avoid some of 
the pitfalls associated with traditional rulemaking. This reco=endation proposes that the Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-14 (1976 & Supp. IV 1976) [hereinafter cited as 
FACA] and the APA be amended to facilitate the use of negotiation rulemaking procedures. Rec-
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procedures should not be ignored. When broader participation seems neces-
sary but industry cooperation seems likely, the Commission may choose to 
o=endation 82-4: Procedures for Negotiating Proposed Regulations (June 18, 1982) [hereinafter 
cited as Reco=endation], based on P. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the Malaise? 
(Jan. 1982) (Report prepared for consideration of The Committee on Interagency Coordination of 
the Administrative Conference of the United States). The Reco=endation states that "[t]he pur-
pose of this reco=endation is to establish a supplemental rulemaking procedure that can be used 
in appropriate circumstances to permit the direct participation of affected interests in the develop-
ment of proposed rules." Reco=endation, supra, at 2. It identifies the major failure of current 
rulemaking procedures as the adversarial postures it induces in the participants: 
[T]he participants, including the agency, tend to develop adversarial relationships with 
each other causing them to take extreme positions, to withhold information from one 
another, and to attack the legitimacy of opposing positions. Because of the adversarial 
relationships, participants often do not focus on creative solutions to problems, ranking 
of the issues involved in a rulemaking, or the important details involved in a rule. Ex-
tensive factual records are often developed beyond what is necessary. Long periods of 
delay result and participation in rulemaking proceedings can become needlessly expen-
sive. Moreover, many participants perceive their roles in the rulemaking proceeding 
more as positioning themselves for the subsequent judicial review than as contributing to 
a solution on the merits at the administrative level. Finally, many participants remain 
dissatisfied with the policy judgments made at the outcome of rulemaking proceedings. 
Id. at I. 
Fourteen specific suggestions are made describing the procedure that should be instituted to 
establish a negotiation rulemaking procedure: 
I. Agencies should establish a regulatory negotiation group to draft a proposed rule. 
2. Congress should enact legislation to facilitate negotiated rulemaking. 
3. Congress should authorize agencies to designate a convenor to organize negotiations. 
The convenor should be a neutral organization, individual or agency appointed by th~: implement-
ing agency. 
4. The convenor should conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether a negotiating 
group should be em panelled. The convenor should look to the following considerations to deter-
mine the usefulness of supplemental rulemaking to solve a given problem. 
a. Issues should be mature and ripe for decision. 
b. Resolution of issues involved in rulemaking should not be such as to require the 
negotiation participants to compromise fundamental tenets. 
c. Only a limited number of interests should be affected by the negotiation, the affected 
interests should be identified and then representatives should be selected to participate in the 
rulemaking conference. 
d. There should be several diverse issues involved in the proceeding so as to allow par-
ticipants to rank their priorities. 
e. No single issue should dominate the negotiation. 
f. Participants should make a good faith co=itment to negotiate and draft a rule. 
g. The agency should be willing and designate an appropriate staff member to represent 
the agency in the negotiation. 
5. If the convenor and the agency determine that negotiation rulemaking is appropriate, the 
convenor should determine what interests are affected, negotiation participants, the scope of the 
negotiation and the negotiation schedule. 
6. If an existing nongovernmental standards-writing organization exists, and enjoys the sup-
port of respective interests involved, the existing organization should be designated a regulatory 
negotiation group for the purposes of this reco=endation. 
7. The agency should publish notice of proposed negotiation rulemaking in the Federal Reg-
ister. 
8. The agency should also designate a senior official to represent the agency in negotiation 
and identify the official in the Federal Register. 
9. The agency should provide financial assistance to affected interests who would otherwise 
be unlikely or unable to participate in negotiation. 
10. A mediator should be appointed if such an appointment would facilitate effective nego-
tiations. 
1 I. The goal of the negotiating group should be to arrive at a consensus rule. If a consensus 
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employ interpretative rulemaking-industry guides. In the event that an in-
dustry fails to make a good faith effort to cooperate with consumers and the 
government, the Commission might need to resort to legislative rulemaking-
trade regulation rules-or class adjudications. 
The first effort should be negotiated rulemaking. To be effective, the 
FTC's procedure for making negotiated rules should be modified in several 
ways. 164 First, the FTC should be required to promulgate detailed, custom-
made industry rules in response to an actively conducted trade practice confer-
ence. A resort to boiler plate rules would serve only to denigrate~ the process in 
the eyes of both industry and the consumer. 
Any interested person should be allowed to request an agency trade prac-
tice conference. The industry, in particular, may be willing to do so only if 
few members are participating in unfair practice or if the situation indicates a 
strong threat of more forceful regulation, legislation, or individual complaints. 
The FTC staff should study the request for a conference and advise the Com-
mission whether to institute a proceeding. The FTC should make available.to 
all interested persons a record and summary of trade practice conference re-
quests, and any Commission action taken, in order to prevent •:::laims of inap-
propriate Commission action or inaction. By providing a record of its actions 
with regard to conference requests, the Commission would meet any criticisms 
that it failed to respond adequately to requests for trade practice conferences. 
Of course, the agency's use of trade practice rules should not be totally 
reactive. It should include in its studies and investigation ofvalious industries 
the potential for industry cooperation in solving identified problems. In addi-
tion, it should plan law enforcement strategies that incorporate trade practice 
rules among the options available. 
Once the Commission determines that institution of a trade practice con-
ference is necessary, it should notifY industry members and publish a notice of 
the impending proceeding in the Federal Register. The Commission should 
then establish an informal committee to draft a set of proposed rules and to 
deliniate the major issues to be dealt with at the trade practice conference. 
This committee should be composed of the interested factions in the rulemak-
rule cannot be arrived at the group should state specifically the problems encountered that pre-
vented establishment of a consensus rule. 
12. The negotiating group should be authorized to hold closed meetings if the group feels 
that closed meetings would facilitate the rulemaking. 
13. The agency should publish the text of the negotiated rule in the Federal Register, fol-
lowed by any proposed agency changes with reasons therefor. 
14. The negotiating group should be given an opportunity to review any comments received 
in response to the notice of proposed rulemaking to determine whether changes in the proposed 
rule need to be changed. Final responsibility for issuing the rule, however, should remain with the 
agency. 
/d. at 2-5. See P. Harter, supra. 
This recommendation, although addressing the informal rulemaking process as a whole, has 
equal application to FTC rulemaking. 
164. A Senate bill introduced in this Congress would establish a structure for rulemaking 
through negotiation for all government agencies. SeeS. 1601, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
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ing process, typically the industry, consumers, and the FTC.165 By providing 
for an appointment of a committee composed of various factions with differing 
views, the Commission could successfully avoid the staff bias problem encoun-
tered in the present trade regulation rulemaking procedure. In addition, the 
committee would serve to deliniate and focus issues prior to the proceeding, so 
that all participants would have a better idea of the goals to be accomplished 
and the stakes involved in the upcoming conference. As a result, the proposed 
rules would likely be more responsive to the needs of all interested parties 
early in the process. 
The FTC should allow the industry that is the focus of the conference to 
appoint members of the committee whenever feasible. Many industries have 
trade associations that could serve this function. The Commission must, how-
ever, assure that industry representatives represent the views of all facets of the 
industry. The FTC should therefore reserve the right to select alternate mem-
bers of the committee and to reject the preselected industry members if it de-
termines that a faction of the industry would otherwise go unrepresented or be 
overrepresented in the preconference discussions. 
The FTC might appoint a similar number of consumer representatives to 
the preconference committee to assure that all views are aired. The FTC 
should have wide discretion to appoint consumer representatives that ade-
quately represent the consumer interest in a particular trade practice confer-
ence proceeding. These consumer representatives could be appointed from the 
various general and specialized consumer rights organizations and from the 
general public. 
While consumer representatives may be useful, they should be included 
only when they will have something to contribute and should not be consid-
ered advocates for a point of view. If the result is unbalanced representation 
in favor of the industry, the rule will be open to challenge. On the other hand, 
the purpose of the conference is to ensure that the imposition of consumer 
interest values does not unduly interfere with the operation of the market-
place; therefore, it is the industry's views and information that are crucial. 
Once a committee is appointed, it should determine and designate the 
principal issues to be discussed and resolved at the forthcoming trade practice 
conference. The FTC staff will be responsible for the background work neces-
sary to prepare for the trade practice conference. By drawing on outside ex-
pertise at this point in the process, the FTC would reap the added advantage 
of diversity of viewpoint at the earliest possible phase in the proceeding. 
· 165. The Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-14 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) may 
apply to such conferences. If so, the FACA would create problems in terms of openness and 
notice requirements. CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE FOR THE SUBCOMM. OF ENERGY, Nu-
CLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND FEDERAL SERVICES OF THE SENATE CoMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL 
AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 2D. SESS., FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT, SOURCE BooK: LEOIS· 
LATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DocUMENTS (Comm. Print 1978); Markham, The Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, 35 U. PITT. L. REv. 557,571 (1974). Because some of these requirements 
would interfere with rulemaking through negotiation, Senate Billl601, S. 1601, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. § 8 (1981), would exempt a "regulatory negotiation committee" from the Act. 
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Once the committee designates issues, it should discuss and draft an ini-
tial set of proposed rules addressing the problems that are to be faced at the 
forthcoming conference. The committee need not agree on a set of proposed 
rules at this stage. In fact, well-articulated alternatives may serve further to 
clarify and emphasize the crucial issues to be decided at the conference. For 
example, if three subgroups of the committee each supports a different or par-
tially different set of rules for dealing with the problems to be discussed at the 
conference, the three alternatives and supporting rationales should be set out 
for discussion by the participants at the trade practice conference. The system 
need not be limited because, generally speaking, the more alternatives the 
better. 
After the proposed rules or alternative set of rules are drafted, the FTC 
should set a time, date, and place for the conference, notify the interested par-
ties, and publish the proposed rules in the Federal Register.166 Even though 
the trade conference procedure utilizes selective participation, public notice 
should be given. The notice should explain the alternative proposals and why 
the proposed rule was adopted. This notice should be sent to all participants 
and published. 
When the conference convenes, the FTC staff should function as media-
tor and leader of the conference participants. The FTC attorneys should seek 
to explore the various alternative regulations and to encourage open and frank 
discussion by all present. The agency should function as a neutral facilitator 
to encourage creative exploration of available solutions to a given problem. 
The FTC.must designate representatives to participate in the conference. 
Although this panel should be larger than the issue-designating committee, it 
must remain selective. Selective representation may exclude some who wish a 
voice in the process, and the Commission must remember that the goal of this 
process is to reap the benefits of small group decisionmaking. A small number 
of participants assures that the proceeding will efficiently consolidate represen-
tation of the major interests. It will tend to mold opinion and information into 
a workable unit and thus assure a compact record. More importantly, the 
small group will permit real exchange of understanding, elaboration of special 
interests' difficulties, and development of ideas to bring about real problem 
solving. Therefore, despite the desire to include all interested participants in 
the conference panel, rulemaking panels must be small enough to take full 
advantage of the conference approach. 
The character of the actual meeting must be that of a committee trying to 
solve a common problem. Much of the advantage of the conference approach 
will be lost if the exchange deteriorates into a mere struggle to protect individ-
166. The FACA generally requires that all advisory committee meetings be open to the public. 
5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (1976). Moreover, the records, minutes, drafts, agenda, transcript, and all other 
documents of each advisory committee must be made available to the public. The F ACA requires 
that timely notice be given through publication in the Federal Register that an advisory committee 
is to be created. Id § 9(a)(2). This notice requirement is designed to assure that the public and 
the Congress have an opportunity to challenge establishment of any proposed committee. S. REP. 
No. 1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972). 
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ual interests. The final aim must be group consciousness, and every represen-
tative must understand that he or she is there to help fashion a workable, 
negotiated regulatory scheme. The process can succeed only if industry, gov-
ernment, and consumers have a realistic view of the relative positions of each 
other and thus make a cooperative rulemaking effort. The Commission must 
serve not as a cohort of either industry or consumer interests, but rather as a 
champion of both. By allowing Commission attorneys to maintain an objec-
tive view of a problem and its solution, a more evenly reasoned rule is likely to 
result from a regulatory proceeding. 
In this regard, the desired openness of the conference becomes a problem. 
In negotiation, there is value in private exchange, argument, and compromise. 
Rulemaking negotiation also might need the freedom of nonpublic negotia-
tion. On the other hand, industry-wide deals are even less likely to meet with 
public trust than other closed door government negotiations. The Federal Ad-
visory Committee Act limits nondisclosure of information discussed in meet-
ings between the government and outside persons. 167 Therefore, the pressure 
to open the meetings is strong but should sometimes be resisted. 
Ordinarily the conference should be open to observation by th;e general 
public. Experience shows that very few observers from outside the affected 
industry will attend. The advantages of selective participation will not be di-
minished by the open meeting because those advantages stem from creating an 
exchange of views among a workably sized group. That this exchange is con-
ducted in public ordinarily will not matter. When, however, the conferees find 
the need for closed door meetings, the process might provide for it. The Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act might be avoided by arguing that business nego-
tiation by its nature involves confidential business information. Since the 
results of the negotiation will be available for public scrutiny there should be 
little danger in the closed door process. As an added precaution, however, the 
closed meeting should be taped so that a court may hear the tapes of the entire 
negotiation session if asked to review allegations of collusion. In this manner, 
the process can take advantage of the recognized advantages of closed door 
negotiation without raising the specter of government/industry collusion that 
plagued the prior use of trade practice conferences. 
Occasionally, more than one conference may be needed to define ade-
quately issues and attempt to resolve differences or reach compromise between 
the participants in the conference. The most valuable function of the trade 
practice conference procedure is the exchange of information, views, and ideas 
by the participants. This exchange may reflect practical problems or disclose a 
more complicated situation than was originally surmised. The first conference 
may recommend no more than a second conference to consider a more sophis-
167. FACA, 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(d) (1976). Any group that meets in an advisory capacity with 
government officials may fall under the FACA. See Center for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689, 
693-94 (D.C. Cir. 1978). But see Nader v. Baroody, 396 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1975); Consumers 
Union ofU.S., Inc. v. HEW, 409 F. Supp. 473 (D.D.C. 1976), qjf'd, 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
The F ACA excludes advice and information sought by federal officials "for the purpose of carry-
ing out an operational duty." Markham, supra note 165, at 577. 
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ticated proposal, or it may resolve only a few of the issues presented to it and 
leave other problems for the future. It may recommend the adoption of an 
interim or an experimental set of rules, the results ofwhich willlbe continually 
studied and made the subject of a future conference. The conference may 
recommend that the problem be made the subject of public rulemaking 
through industry guides or trade regulation rules, or remedied by class 
adjudication. 
After discussion, the participants should try to formulate a common posi-
tion on the issues presented. Unanimity, however, is unnecessary. Some con-
solidation and consensus should be produced, but it is not necessary that the 
committee present only one view. The Commission, however, must take ulti-
mate responsibility for the final rule. It must, therefore, adopt a set of rules 
that meets the needs and addresses the views of all conference participants. 
After the conference, notice of the rule submitted by the conferees to the 
FTC for approval should again be published. Any report or memorandum in 
support of the proposed rule should be made available to the public. The 
notice should describe the method for obtaining such supporting documents. 
The nature and force of the rule should be an important part of the deci-
sion. The conference should decide how much force it wants to give a negoti-
ated rule. The force might vary from a rule that the Commission hopes will 
find industry acceptance to one that the Commission advises will be vigorously 
enforced with individual complaints. The concreteness of the regulatory pre-
scription might also vary greatly. The conference may recommend experi-
mentation or it may be content merely to provide answers to a few established 
scenarios. Flexibility in the nature of the rule will be an important element in 
negotiated rulemaking. 
The ABA Antitrust Committee distinction between "definitional" rules 
and "preventive" rules is useful in this context.168 "Definitional" rules merely 
define bad practices; the industry is instructed how to behave. "Preventive" 
rules establish a compliance apparatus with which to prevent law violation. 
The whole industry is required to comply with somewhat burdensome proce-
dures even though only a few members are using illegal practices or would fail 
to comply with the agency's wishes once they were articulated clearly. Preven-
tive rules create a significant burden on both the innocent and guilty, and their 
overuse has led to much of the criticism of FTC regulation. The trade practice 
conference should avoid preventive rules except in the rare case. By its nature, 
the conference procedure should result in definitional rules with which the 
vast majority of the industry will comply without stringent compliance proce-
dures. When preventive rules are necessary, they generally should be under-
taken in trade regulation rule proceedings, because they would be supported 
by a record built on public procedure and should be strictly enforceable. 
Moreover, legislation covering FTC rulemaking procedure dictates that 
168. Report of the Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association Concerning the Federal 
Trade Commission Structures, Powers and Procedures, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), 
Special Supp. 5-6 (Feb. 14, 1980). 
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trade practice conference rules must be interpretative. The trade practice rules 
traditionally have been interpretative.169 In addition, both the FTCIA and the 
1980 Improvement Act mandate procedures for legislative rules and thus fore-
close rulemaking by negotiation for such rules. 170 It could be argued that 
these procedures can be waived, but because they accrue to the benefit of the 
general public it would be difficult to make the waiver valid against all inter-
ested persons with a right to participate. Regardless, the classification of trade 
practice rules as interpretative or legislative may be immaterial in the FTC's 
own enforcement action, for the law is fairly clear that an agency is bound by 
its interpretative rules.171 The procedural difference may be that the adminis-
trative law judge in a subsequent enforcement hearing will have to go through 
the process of taking official notice of a trade practice rule. 172 These consider-
ations are not too important because the process anticipates large scale cooper-
ation; enforcement factors would relate only to a small number of recalcitrant 
industry members. 
The Commission must zealously monitor industry compliance with an en-
acted trade practice conference rule. Successful use of this procedure requires 
that the agency promptly enforce the rules against nonconforming firms. The 
Commission must be willing to establish the machinery necessary to maintain 
contact with industry in the post-rule period. In addition, the agency must 
establish a firm policy of pursuing violators and correcting violations. The 
government must be willing to invest sufficient resources and manpower in the 
enforcement arm of the trade practice conference process to ensure the force-
ful presence of Commission regulatory authority. One of the strongest criti-
cisms of the old trade practice conference procedure regarded its 
ineffectiveness because of the lack of agency enforcement; this defect must be 
avoided if reinstituting the procedure is to be successful. 
This is not to say that every violation should be a matter for prosecution. 
The FTC should operate on the assumption that a timely warning is more 
valuable and less expensive than a tardy prosecution. The FTC should work 
actively with industry to ensure compliance. Formal prosecution should be 
viewed as a last resort used against recalcitrant industry. The more flexible, 
informal means of enforcement should be used to encourage industry compli-
169. See Northern Feather Works, Inc. v. FTC, 234 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1956); Surrey Sleep 
Prods., Inc., 73 FTC 523 (1968). 
170. Senate Billl080, S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1981), would require procedures for 
an interpretative rule that "has general applicability and substantially alters or creates rights or 
obligations of persons outside the agency." 
171. Failure of an agency to follow its own interpretive rules should be prima facie evidence of 
arbitrary and capricious administrative action. See Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. 
Supp. 1298, 1303 n.23 (D.D.C. 1973), mod!fied on other grounds, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on S. 1080 liupported a provision including important 
interpretative rules under its public procedure by business testimony that "[i]n practice, this 'gui-
dance' was just as binding as a substantive rule." S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 I (1981) 
(citing Regulator Reform Act-S. 1080: Hearings on S. 1080 Before the Subcomm. on Regulatory 
Reform if the Senate Comm. if the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 629 (1981)). 
172. See Harry E. Strauss, 63 FTC 1912, 1930 (1963). But see Surrey Sleep Prods., Inc., 73 
FTC 523, 531 (1968). 
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ance as long as the informal compliance processes do not become specious, as 
they have in the past. 
If negotiation does not work, the FTC should consider one of the other 
two forms of rulemaking. Negotiated rules must be a complement to the two 
forms of rulemaking through public participation. The three types of rules 
should be viewed as parts in an arsenal of law giving and law enforcement 
techniques. In some cases general public participation or open forum will be 
the best way to proceed. It may be that some rules should have the force of a 
legislative rule. In other industries, problems are serious and concrete enough 
to warrant solution through class adjudication. 
Industry guide procedures should be used as an adjunct procedure to the 
trade practice conference rules. When, for example, a particular practice per-
vades several industries, it might be impractical and unwieldy to attempt a 
trade practice conference. The industry guide procedure could be used to pro-
mulgate standards in such a situation; the FTC could still choose to make 
intrepretative rules through abbreviated procedure but could additionally en-
courage public participation in the process. 
Generally, the guides present a more feasible, practical approach to inter-
industry regulatory efforts and enforcement than that available through the 
traditional trade practice conference procedure. The trade practice conference 
procedure is designed to regulate a single industry. Prior to the institution of 
the guides program in 1955, the FTC sought to regulate on an interindustry 
basis by including standard boilerplate prohibitions and rules in each set of 
trade practice conference rules. Guides proved more effective in accomplish-
ing this function. Frequently a practice is prevalent in several industries; issu-
ance of an industry guide has the practical effect of providing a standard rule 
regulating practice that is applicable to the marketplace as a whole. 
Furthermore, the Commission is not required to secure industry coopera-
tion when issuing guides. Thus, industry guides can be formulated to regulate 
a recalcitrant industry not initially inclined towards cooperation and compli-
ance with FTC regulatory ideas. In other words, the industry guides process 
not only gives the regulated industry the opportunity to participate in regula-
tory efforts, but also gives the FTC an offensive weapon against an industry 
that refuses to cooperate. 
Although the guide process may be chosen because of the absence of an-
ticipated industry cooperation, it also carries the judgment that a legislative 
rule is inappropriate to the situation. This judgment could be based on a find-
ing that interindustry rules could not ·be sufficiently specific to justify a rule 
having the force of law. It could be based on the FTC's need to experiment 
with more broadly worded and less forceful rules. The FTC might choose 
guides in order to act quickly without the interference of the cumbersome 
trade regulation rule procedures. 
Industry guide procedures should be viewed as a flexible measure with 
which the FTC can fill in the procedural gaps created when the institution of a 
trade practice conference or the trade regulation rule procedures would be 
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inappropriate or difficult to accomplish. Guides should be promulgated as 
they are now: with a minimum of procedural requirement and a maximum of 
flexibility. In connection with the promulgation of industry guides, the Com-
mission should use the provisions of section 1.6 of the Rules of Practice, which 
allows the Commision staff to take advantage of compulsory processes in the 
investigative, nonadjudicative procedures.I73 
As a last resort, when neither a trade practice conference procedure nor 
an industry guide procedure is appropriate, the FTC should consider initiation 
of a trade regulation rulemaking procedure. While trade regulation might not 
be preferred, it should be retained in the agency's arsenal of regulatory weap-
ons. Before the FTC uses the trade regulation rulemaking procedure, how-
ever, it should determine that there exists a need for concrete rules having the 
force of law. In the event that the agency decides to institute a trade regula-
tion rulemaking proceeding, the industry affected should have a thirty-day 
grace period in which to make a good faith effort to argue for the institution of 
a trade practice conference in lieu of a trade regulation rule. This procedure 
will encourage industry cooperative efforts and place the responsibility for the 
successful outcome of the trade practice conference on the industry to be 
regulated. 
The FTC should identify through procedural rules situations in which it 
will make the choice oflegislative rulemaking over guides or negotiated rules. 
Industries with a large number of bad actors, for example, might require the 
added force of legislative rules. Industries in which negotiated rules or guides 
have been tried might suggest at least certain instances in which legislative 
rules should be useful. Interpretative rules, for example, are particularly ap-
propriate when "the answers are unclear and experimentation is necessary, but 
once answers e~erge, the more concrete trade regulation rule could finalize 
the positive results of the experiments. 
The FTC should consciously select from among its tools the most cost-
effective law enforcement vehicle. Certain recent problem areas, for example, 
might have been better handled by a more sophisticated use of all the agency's 
regulatory tools. Instead of starting with a trade regulation rule in children's 
advertising, for example, the FTC might have started with broadly written 
interpretative rules developed either through negotiation or public participa-
tion. By now, it would have received information about the impact of its regu-
latory scheme with which to promulgate the legislative rules it proposed in a 
relative vacuum years ago. It might have identified areas in which it cannot 
regulate, areas in which industry cooperation is the only hope, areas in which 
only soft direction from the government can work, and areas in which concrete 
prescriptions are needed. It might even have identified certain segments of the 
industry that could not have been dealt with through rulemaking but needed 
the direct action of class adjudication. Instead, it started too quickly to regu-
late practices it did not understand; it ended in an unsuccessful rulemaking 
173. Organization, Procedures and Rules of Practice, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.6, 2.7 (1982). 
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effort. For this type of reckless action the FTC is criticized, and justifiably so, 
for the FTC has the tools to proceed effectively with wisdom and patience. It 
must endeavor to use its legislative rulemaking power sparingly, to the best 
advantage of the marketplace. Nonetheless, a legislative rule is sometimes nec-
essary. If used sparingly, the soundness of the agency's choice will be accepted 
by business, albeit begrudgingly. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The function of the FTC is to maintain a workable market economy. It 
might do this by assuring that competitive market forces are free to work, and 
by creating consumer confidence so that consumers unhesitatingly participate 
in the market. The FTC has deviated from market maintenance goals, moving 
instead toward a moralistic regulation of market performance. Criticism for 
this misdirection should not be allowed to inhibit the agency's market mainte-
nance function; it should not lead to a call, especially from the free market 
enthusiasts, for less FTC activity. The true answer to these criticisms is a 
sound FTC enforcement policy, but the FTC must be ever conscious of its 
responsibility to keep the free market functioning effectively. 
How can we assure that the FTC will take proper account of all the fac-
tors which make the market work to the benefit of all elements of society? 
Trial-type devices are too myopic to foster that goal; they only result in delay 
and narrowly focused decisions. The solution lies in a rulemaking procedure 
that concentrates on broad fact gathering and the development of general pol-
icy goals. · 
Why has rulemaking failed at the FTC? A major cause is the FTC's in-
sensitivity to the societal value of business activities. The FTC has failed to 
incorporate business interests into its decisionmaking processes. Adverse im-
pact on an industry necessarily results in an adverse impact on consumers. All 
the interests under the care of the FTC have been disserved by its adversarial 
attitude toward commercial interests. 
It is clear that this insensitivity cannot be attributed to lack of input by the 
target industries. The records in FTC trade regulation rulemaking proceed-
ings are dominated by industry submissions and testimony. It is, therefore, 
not the absence of opportunity, but the absence of impact on the decisions that 
created the problem. The answer to this problem is to use an informal process 
that results in a rule negotiated between the FTC, representatives of consumer 
interests, and commercial interests. This negotiation will create a more worka-
ble rule that has the advantages not only of assuring optimum market per-
formance, but alSo of retaining industry aquiescence, even if reluctantly 
acquired. Indeed, for number of years the FTC used exactly such a process. 
Rulemaking by negotiation should be reinstituted and should dominate FTC 
process. Other broad regulatory tools--interpretative or legislative rules made 
through public participation and class adjudication-should be built around 
this device. 
